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We hear much about the “crisis” in legal education:1 high tuition costs, steep 
declines in law school enrollment, 2  and graduates who are unprepared for 
practice and unable to find jobs.  Although the legal profession experienced the 
                                                        
 1. JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND 
RESPONSES TO CHANGE 1 (2013) (arguing that the legal profession faces a crisis “every decade or 
so”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS x (2012).  See Paul Campos, The Crisis of the 
American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 177, 222 (2012) (“The status quo in American 
legal education has become unsustainable.”); William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 461, 462 (2013) (indicating that the structural shift in the legal profession requires a 
transformative reassessment of the traditional law school curriculum); Kyle P. McEntee et al., The 
Crisis in Legal Education: Dabbling in Disaster Planning, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 225, 226‒27 
(2012) (discussing the huge nationwide drop in applications to law schools, the inability of 
graduates to get jobs, lawsuits against law schools for fraudulent advertising and student 
recruitment practices, and stories in leading newspapers and media outlets questioning the value of 
a legal education); Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2012, at SR10 (discussing the poor employment prospects of law school graduates and the serious 
need for pragmatic changes in legal education); Katherine Mangan, Educators Make the Case for 
Going to Law School, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 3, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Educators 
-Make-the-Case-for/143791 (reporting discussions on the crisis at the 2014 meeting of the 
Association of American Law Schools, where it was “acknowledged that times were tough” for law 
schools, with total enrollment at its lowest level since 1975, when there were thirty-nine fewer ABA 
accredited law schools than today). 
 2. Between 2010 and 2013, law school applications saw a thirty-eight percent decline with 
numbers down to pre-1983 levels.  Karen Sloan, Avoiding Law School in Droves: The Number of 
Applicants Has Slumped by 20 Percent, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 28, 2013, at 1.  In 2014, only twenty-one 
of the 201 ABA-accredited schools placed seventy-five percent or more of their graduates in jobs 
requiring a law degree.  See Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Law Jobs: By the 
Numbers, EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAW., http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/law-jobs/ca 
lculator (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (providing data on each school’s placement statistics).  Between 
1985 and 2011, the median tuition increased from $3,746 to $19,788 at public schools and from 
$15,438 to $39,496 at private schools.  See Campos, supra note 1, at 180‒81 (citing ABA data).  
The average law school debt of 2012 graduates exceeded $140,000 at twenty law schools, though 
at many of these schools, less than half of the graduating class secured jobs requiring a J.D. degree.  
See Brian Tamanaha, The Law Graduate Debt Disaster Goes Critical, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 12, 
2013, 10:30 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-law-graduate-debt-disaster-goes.html 
[hereinafter Tamanaha, Disaster].  The average amount borrowed by law graduates is now 
$124,950, up seventy-eight percent from 2002, while the average starting salary has fallen to 
$78,653, down sixteen percent from 2009.  See id.  Yet, even with these new economic realities, 
law school may still be a good investment for many.  See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, 
The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 1, 1, 65 tbl.10 (HLS Program on the Legal Profession 
Research, Paper No. 2013-6, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2250585 (reporting results of an economic study finding that “given current tuition levels, the 
median and even 25th percentile annual earnings premiums justify enrollment. . . .  We estimate 
the mean pre-tax lifetime value of a law degree [is] approximately [one million dollars].”). 
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prequel to this problem during the 1990s,3 the current predicament is more 
severe and symptomatic of a restructuring in the legal services market.4 
Many blame law professors for the crisis.  Professor Brian Tamanaha, author 
of Failing Law Schools,5 asserts that tenured law professors, who seek to serve 
their professional and economic interests at the expense of their students’ best 
interest, have captured law schools and the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
accrediting process. 6   Such critiques of legal education created a 
firestorm,7 though not only in the legal academy.  Multiple articles published in 
                                                        
 3. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a 
Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 709 
(1996) (noting that many critics complain that law schools fail to teach the skills students will need 
in law practice). 
 4. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 168‒71; Campos, supra note 1, at 213; Henderson, supra 
note 1, at 462, 479‒89.  But see D. Benjamin Barros, Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom on 
the Legal Job Market, 1‒2 (Widener Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-
60, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258806 (arguing that the current downturn may 
not be so different from the downturn in the 1990s). 
 5. The National Jurist magazine recently named Professor Tamanaha one of the twenty-four 
most influential legal educators.  Many say that his reform proposals, which much of the public 
appears to endorse, will “have an enormous impact . . . on legal education.”  TAMANAHA, supra 
note 1, at back cover (quoting Professor William Henderson, Indiana Univ. Law School).  See also 
Symposium, Can Law Schools Prepare Students to be Practice Ready?, 17 CHAPMAN L. REV. 153, 
164 (2013) [herineafter CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP.] (noting that Professor R. Michael Cassidy 
believes that Failing Law Schools has “been instrumental in encouraging a lot of the debates we’ve 
been having right now” about legal education). 
 6. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 44‒45. 
 7. For example, Professor Paul Campos created a blog titled Inside the Law School Scam; 
the inaugural post stated that he could “no longer ignore that, for a very large proportion of my 
students, law school has become something very much like a scam. . . . [A]t the level of actual 
moral responsibility, [it] is that law professors are scamming their students.”  Daniel D. Barnhizer, 
Cultural Narratives of the Legal Profession: Law School, Scamblogs, Hopelessness, and the Rule 
of Law, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 663, 672‒73 (2012).  In response, Professor Brian Leiter argued 
that Professor Campos 
is the failed academic who has done almost no scholarly work in the last decade, teaches 
the same courses and seminars year in and year out, and spends his time trying to attract 
public attention . . . . [H]e is indeed scamming his students and his state, and his initial 
posts were tantamount to a confession that he’s not doing his job. 
Id. at 673‒74.  See also Anders Walker, Tamanaha’s Response, FACULTY FLOW: A BLOG FOR 
ASSOCIATE DEANS (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.slu.edu/colleges/law/slulaw/faculty.flow (posting 
that “Tamanaha has written an incendiary book that WILL be read by university presidents, 
trustees, and others eager to cut costs, strip faculty resources, and stick it to law professors”). 
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the New York Times,8 Wall Street Journal,9 Los Angeles Times,10 National Law 
Journal,11 and Forbes12 generated vigorous public debate about the value and 
efficacy of legal education, which in turn spurred the establishment of the Law 
School Transparency Project.13  Even President Barack Obama weighed in on 
the crisis.14  The ABA, in response to the “intense and unprecedented criticism 
in national media, blogs, Congress, the courts, and elsewhere” directed at law 
schools, 15  formed an emergency task force to address the problem. 16   As 
Professor James E. Moliterno observes, “for all the reasons why it’s a bad time 
for legal education, it’s a great time to be a legal education reformer.”17 
The brief against law professors stems from their demands for increased 
faculty sizes and salaries, and their focus on scholarly work, which critics claim 
is mostly irrelevant to practitioners and students and only diverts professors from 
their teaching responsibilities.18  Law faculties instituted allegedly self-serving 
                                                        
 8. Caplan, supra note 1. 
 9. Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, In Rare Step, Law Schools Shrink Faculty, WALL ST. J., 
July 16, 2013, at B1; Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 
2012, 10:18 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304458604577486623469958 
142.html; Kaplan Bar Review Survey: 63% of Law School Graduates from the Class of 2013 
Believe That Law School Education Can Be Condensed to Two Years, BUSINESS WIRE (Sept. 10, 
2013, 8:35 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130910005628/en/Kaplan-Bar-
Review-Survey-63-Law-School#.VPs8OsYd18c [hereinafter Kaplan Bar Review Survey]. 
 10. Jason Song, Faced with Job Complaints, Loyola Law School Accepting Fewer Students, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2013, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/19/local/la-me-
loyola-law-20130819. 
 11. Sloan, supra note 2. 
 12. J. Maureen Henderson, Why Attending Law School Is the Worst Career Decision You’ll 
Ever Make, FORBES, June 26, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jmaureenhenderson/2012/06/26/ 
why-attending-law-school-is-the-worst-career-decision-youll-ever-make/. 
 13. See LST Details, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/blog 
/about (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (“Law School Transparency is a nonprofit legal education policy 
organization dedicated to improving consumer information and to reforming the traditional law 
school model.”).  See also TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC. 16 (Am. Bar Assoc., 
Working Paper Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/profe 
ssional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/aba_task_force_working_paper_august_2013.authchec
kdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE RPT.] (stating that the ABA now requires greater 
transparency from law schools). 
 14. Peter Lattman, Obama Says Law School Should Be 2, Not 3, Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
2013, at B3 (quoting President Barack Obama’s remarks at a town-hall meeting held at Binghamton 
University). 
 15. See ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 6‒7. 
 16. Id. at 1. 
 17. CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., supra note 5, at 158. 
 18. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 42, 54‒55 (noting that decreased teaching loads and 
increased focus on scholarship, which in turn increases tuition costs, may reduce law professors’ 
commitment to teaching practice-relevant skills to their students); Brent E. Newton, Preaching 
What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and 
Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 
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practices, such as hiring scholars instead of professionals who can provide 
practical lawyering skills training to students.19 
Proposals to address the crisis appear to enjoy wide support,20 and, as seen in 
the recommendations of the ABA’s Task Force on the Future of Legal 
Education, 21  may be poised to change dramatically the landscape of legal 
education.  Yet, such reforms will harm law students and the legal profession, 
placing the legal academy “under erasure,”22 as Jacques Derrida would say, by: 
(1) reorienting legal education from an academically-grounded education 
toward vocational training; (2) eliminating one year from the traditional three-
year program for the J.D. degree; (3) allowing graduates of non-ABA accredited 
law schools to sit for the bar examination, rendering accreditation a toothless 
mechanism for ensuring academic quality; and (4) gutting law faculty 
scholarship. 
The truth is that legal education is broken because it fails to prepare students 
for the demands of modern law practice, an industry more complex and 
interdisciplinary than ever before.  A two-year law degree focusing on practice 
skills, as many are now proposing, takes us back nearly a century in time when 
law schools were little more than vocational schools.23  Eliminating a full year 
of legal education will not better equip law students to be practicing lawyers, 
especially considering that today’s three-year program of legal education 
produces graduates insufficiently prepared to practice law.  Rather, to make the 
value of legal education worth its cost, the industry must rethink the purpose of 
law schools. 
I write from the vantage point of someone who has been a law student and 
graduate student, a law and psychology professor at four different universities, 
and a law school associate dean and current senior university administrator.  This 
                                                        
105, 107‒08 (2010).  See also ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 6‒16 (summarizing current 
criticisms of legal education and noting that the faculty culture at law schools creates expectations 
of job security and a focus on scholarship that may be adverse to the market interests of law 
schools). 
 19. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 55‒61; Newton, supra note 18, at 140‒56. 
 20. See, e.g., Law Grads Give Schools High Marks, But Want Change, NAT’L JURIST (Sept. 
17, 2013), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/law-grads-give-schools-high-marks-want-
change (reporting results of a survey of graduates of the class of 2013: eighty-seven percent thought 
that legal education needed substantial reforms to better prepare students for practice, and sixty-
three percent thought that law school could be shortened to two years). 
 21. See ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 28‒32 (providing possible 
recommendations for legal education reform). 
 22. See Gayatri Chakraorty Spivak, Preface to JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY xiv 
(Gayatri Chakraorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1st Am. ed. 1976) (1974) 
(explaining the deconstructive technique of placing a written term “under erasure”—crossing out a 
word or phrase yet allowing it to remain in the text, denoting that the phrase does not adequately 
signify the concept it represents). 
 23. See David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58, 
67 (1999) (stating that “for more than a century law schools have battled to keep their distance from 
vocational schools and maintain their rightful place in the university”). 
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Article draws upon this experience to fashion a proposal for reforming legal 
education, based on a comparative evaluation of the current model of legal 
education with the models for medical and graduate education. 
Part I of this Article addresses the contention that  tenured law professors have 
become too powerful in shaping legal education.  Part II identifies a long-
standing debate as to whether legal education should focus more on academic 
work or on practical skills training.  Part III argues that legal education must not 
be reshaped into a less academic two-year program of vocational study.  Instead, 
the three-year program should be fashioned into a much more robust curriculum 
that teaches applications of other disciplines (e.g., accounting, economics, 
psychology) to law in addition to the traditional core subjects.  Such an 
integrated, interdisciplinary curriculum would expose law students to a 
reasonable range of specialty areas and integrate practical skills training (e.g., 
client counseling, advocacy, legal drafting) throughout the curriculum.  Part IV 
considers adapting the medical school model to legal education in accomplishing 
the goal of producing better-rounded and practice-ready lawyers.  Such a 
curriculum would provide a comprehensive foundation in basic legal subjects 
interlaced with other legally relevant disciplines and would culminate in a series 
of clinical rotations where basic doctrinal and interdisciplinary knowledge are 
applied in practice.  Part V argues against the claim that if law schools decreased 
their support for faculty scholarship it would reduce costs and incentivize law 
professors to be better teachers of practical skills.  Contrary to popular claims, 
engaged scholars are better teachers, and legal scholarship contributes 
meaningfully and substantially (though often in ways not readily apparent) to 
law practice and law reform efforts.  Finally, Part VI addresses the employment 
problem facing many law students upon graduation, suggesting that we need 
fewer, but better law schools. 
I.  TENURED LAW PROFESSORS: THE PRIVILEGED CLASS ENJOYING ITS 
PRIVILEGES 
In The Philadelphia Story, the protagonist reflecting on high society during 
the Great Depression proclaims, “the prettiest sight in this fine pretty world is 
the privileged class enjoying its privileges.” 24   Are law professors the 
“privileged class enjoying its privileges,” while students cover the cost of their 
salaries by footing soaring tuition bills?25  Do law students view their professors 
as “parasitic leeches who have amazingly cushy jobs, who hypocritically 
pontificated about practicing law while having no real or current experience, 
who cannot get the students jobs, and who do not work more than a couple hours 
                                                        
 24. THE PHILADELPHIA STORY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1940). 
 25. See Barnhizer, supra note 7, at 676 (noting the incredible “degree of bitterness and 
loathing held against [law professors] and [the] profession by this emerging culture of 
disenfranchised law graduates and impoverished students”). 
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a day”?26  The high price law school graduates pay for their legal education 
coupled with poor job prospects, only exacerbate this vexed sentiment.  High 
faculty salaries, a major expenditure of law schools, are believed to be a key 
cause of high tuition costs,27 as well as the desire for higher U.S. News rankings, 
which produces an ever-increasing emphasis on legal scholarship to bolster the 
school’s academic reputation among its peers.28  As a result, professors reduce 
their teaching loads and devote more time to scholarly production, forcing law 
schools to compensate by increasing the number of professors.29  Law schools 
also compete for the “star” professors, who demand even higher compensation 
and lighter teaching loads.30 
Many reformers propose that law schools shrink the size of the full-time 
faculty, increase teaching loads, and rely more on adjunct and part-time 
faculty.31  But faulty assumptions underlie such proposals, which will harm the 
overall quality of students’ legal education.32  It is not the case, for example, that 
law professors devote less time to teaching than their university counterparts, as 
                                                        
 26. Id. at 687.  In addition: 
[T]he matriculating law student [is portrayed as being] tricked into going to law school 
by a coterie of greedy deans and financial-cocaine dealing lenders; preyed upon by an 
uncaring, hypocritical, lazy, and disconnected faculty; and then when they have been bled 
dry, they are thrown out into the world to face a lifetime of debt slavery, hopelessness, 
and despair. 
Id. at 667; see id. at 681 (describing posts to the various “law school scam” blog sites, including 
one site that was visited over 400,000 times). 
 27. See In re Culver, slip op. at 11‒12 (Mont. filed Feb. 7, 2002) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting) 
(noting that some non-ABA accredited law schools, such as the Massachusetts School of Law, are 
able to offer lower tuition rates by having a small full-time faculty and many adjunct professors 
teaching in their specialty area, and “by focusing on its faculties’ classroom ability rather than 
providing extensive time off for research on which the ABA places extensive emphasis but which 
most often contributes nothing to the improvement of society or our profession”); TAMANAHA, 
supra note 1, at 52 (stating that lighter professor course loads requires schools to hire more 
professors); see also Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms of American 
Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. 55, 79‒80 (2012) (arguing that “[l]aw school 
tuition is too high and is wrongly allocated primarily to benefit law professors at the expense of 
law students. . . . [T]he typical tenured professor receives a handsome salary in return for 
contributing relatively little to students’ legal educations”); Jennifer Smith, Law-School Professors 
Face Less Job Security, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10 
001424127887323446404579006793207527958.html (quoting Kent Syverud, Dean of Washington 
University School of Law, arguing that “[l]aw professors and law deans are paid too much. . . . The 
whole problem of [tuition] costs probably would go away if our salaries were halved.”). 
 28. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 62. 
 29. Id. at 126. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 40‒45; Campos, supra note 1, at 216‒17; Mangan, supra note 1, at 3 (reporting 
that some law schools have been reducing faculty size by offering early retirement packages and 
not filling vacancies); Newton, supra note 27, at 125. 
 32. See infra Part V.A. 
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some critics suggest.33  Unlike  professors in graduate schools, law professors 
generally do not have graduate teaching assistants who do much of the exam 
grading, meeting with students, and class lecturing.34  As compared to professors 
in other fields, students and administrators expect more from law professors vis-
à-vis teaching because they teach in a professional school.35   As Professor 
Wallace Loh observed, “[m]ost social scientists, in contrast, view teaching as 
ancillary to their research commitment.  If they were as preoccupied about 
teaching as their law school colleagues, their scholarly productivity would be 
compromised.”36 
Some critics also blame faculty governance, which vests the faculty with most 
of the decision-making authority for faculty hiring and curricular decisions, for 
the problems in legal education.37  Professor Tamanaha sees faculty governance 
and the ABA (the law professors’ “trade union”) as vehicles the “privileged 
class” use to protect its privileges: high salaries, low teaching loads, special 
preferences for tenure-track faculty, and a focus on legal scholarship and pet 
legal theories rather than teaching students practical skills.38  As the ABA’s Task 
Force on the Future of Legal Education reports, “[f]aculty are blamed for 
                                                        
 33. Cf. Newton, supra note 27, at 118‒19 (explaining that “a typical law professor teaches 
only three or four courses per year”). 
 34. J.M. Balkin, Interdiscplinarity As Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 966 
(1996); Richard S. Markovits, Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Introduction, 74 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 317, 348 (1999); cf. Ted Becker & Rachel Croskery-Roberts, Avoiding Common Problems 
in Using Teaching Assistants: Hard Lessons Learned from Peer Teaching Theory and Experience, 
13 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 269, 274 (2007). 
 35. See Paula A. Monopoli, Teaching Lawyers to Be More Than Zealous Advocates, 2001 
WIS. L. REV. 1159, 1170 (2001) (“Law schools are professional schools. . . . It is . . . essential that 
they be given incentives to make their classroom presentations more effective.”). 
 36. WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: CASES, READINGS, 
AND TEXT 737 (Russell Sage Foundation 1984).  Having sat through many faculty and committee 
meetings in law schools and psychology departments at five different universities, I can attest to 
the amount of time devoted to discussing teaching and curricular concerns in law schools as 
compared to psychology departments, where research and grant-getting are the most frequently 
discussed topics.  Indeed, law professors seem to be the only ones in the academy concerned with 
the question of whether being a scholar improves one’s teaching effectiveness, since all but two of 
the studies and articles on this issue were written by law professors.  See Benjamin Barton, Is There 
a Correlation Between Law Professor Publication Counts, Law Review Citation Counts, and 
Teaching Evaluations? An Empirical Study, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 619, 619 (2008); James 
Lindgren & Allison Nagelberg, Are Scholars Better Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823, 823 
(1998); Michael P. O’Connor, Perish the Thought of Publication?: Scholarship’s Critical Role in 
Effective Teaching, 3 PHX. L. REV. 417, 418 (2010); Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of 
Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 369 (1990); Fred R. Shapiro, They 
Published, Not Perished, But Were They Good Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835, 840 (1998). 
 37. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 8, 32; ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 
14 (discussing faculty culture and governance structures as potential obstacles to reforming legal 
education). 
 38. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 16‒19. 
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supposedly self-seeking behavior and the pursuit of questionable goals for the 
law school,”39 and “the prevailing structure for faculty role in a law school, 
reflect[s] the model of a law school as primarily an academic enterprise . . . .  
This entrenched culture and structure has led, inter alia, to declining classroom 
teaching loads and a high level of focus on publishing and research.”40 
To illustrate how faculty governance corrupts the ability of law schools to best 
serve their students, Professor Tamanaha recounts in Failing Law Schools his 
interim deanship at St. John’s University Law School.41  Remarkably, Professor 
Tamanaha was appointed to the deanship as an untenured professor, after 
brazenly complaining to the University’s president that the faculty voted for the 
previous dean’s removal partly because he had pressured them to be good 
teachers and scholars.  He recalled that “[m]any faculty members were hardly 
present in the building, coming in only to teach, leaving immediately thereafter 
. . . . A number were in semiretirement, though not officially.”42  Professor 
Tamanaha uses his short-lived deanship to illustrate what he believes to be the 
problem with law schools and why it is so difficult to reform them.43  He notes 
that “[l]aw schools are run [by professors,]  for law professors” who do not 
devote the attention they should to teaching and serving the best interests of 
students.44  Standard 206 of the ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for 
Approval of Law Schools require that law faculties have “substantial 
involvement in the selection of a dean” and are to “advise, consult, and make 
recommendations to the appointing authority in the selection of a dean.”45  Thus, 
according to Professor Tamanaha, law schools are run to advance the privileges 
of the tenured faculty, over whom deans have limited supervisory power:46 
No one tells law professors what to do.  Law professors are superior 
to the students and served by the staff. . . . For a law school to function 
at a high level requires that individual professors be self-motivated, 
responsible, conscientious, and oriented to the common good even 
                                                        
 39. ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 7. 
 40. Id. at 26‒27. 
 41. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 1‒8. 
 42. Id. at 2.  Professors who are effectively in semiretirement with respect to their scholarly 
and service contributions, a relatively common phenomenon, are derided as “retired-in-place 
(RIP).”  Nancy B. Rapoport, Not Quite “Them,” Not Quite “Us”: Why It’s Difficult for Former 
Deans to Go Home Again, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 591 (2007).  Some decide to take RIP status 
soon after receiving tenure.  Id. 
 43. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 8. 
 44. Id. 
 45. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 206(d) 
(2011) [hereinafter Interpretation 206-1] (emphasis added).  Standard 206 states: “[e]xcept in 
circumstances demonstrating good cause, a dean should not be appointed or reappointed to a new 
term over the stated objection of a substantial majority of the faculty.”  Id. 
 46. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 5‒6 (“Deans wield small sticks for prodding—twigs, 
really—and consequently must resort to passing out goodies to get more out of people.”). 
368 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:359 
when that requires a sacrifice of their own self-interest. . . . Alas, we 
are fallible and self-oriented like everyone else.47 
I value faculty governace more than Professor Tamanaha might, but it does 
produce unintended consequences.  Faculty incentives may not always align 
with the interests of the institution or students, just as any employees not subject 
to managerial oversight may come to regard their interests as not entirely 
consistent with the interests of their employer or the customers.  Curricular 
decisions may be based on what and how particular faculty members want to 
teach rather than the curricula and pedagogy students need, faculty hiring 
decisions may be based on faculty turf battles rather than candidates’ teaching 
and scholarly ability, and faculties may resist rigorous review processes that hold 
them accountable for quality teaching and scholarship. 
Since deans and law school administrators usually are not active teachers and 
scholars,48 they usually have fewer conflicts of interest between what is best for 
students and their own scholarly and teaching interests, and have incentives to 
be more demanding of the faculty than the faculty is of itself.  Faculty 
governance diminishes the accountability of faculty members because when the 
faculty corporately makes a decision that later turns out to be bad, no individual 
is held accountable, and thus there is no way to effectively monitor and improve 
faculty performance.49  By contrast, when deans are granted greater authority 
they become the focus of accountability, both from the faculty—who can 
effectively vote a dean out under ABA standards 50 —as well as from the 
university administration.  Importantly, deans should not be bureaucrats but 
leaders, and part of leading is shaping the institution according to the dean’s 
vision.  A dean cannot do this when many key decisions rest largely with the 
faculty, rather than also with the dean. 
In addition, deans have a better sense of the relationship between the law 
school’s mission and the larger university’s strategic goals and usually a more 
objective, arms’ length perspective on faculty disputes given their outsider’s 
perspective, since most deans were hired from other institutions.51  Moreover, 
by virtue of their position as a university administrator, law school deans are 
tuned into national norms and trends not only in the legal academy but also in 
                                                        
 47. Id. at 8. 
 48. In 2008, the number of law professors increased to 17,080, with 1,059 being deans, 
librarians, and other full-time administrators.  Jack Crittenden, Why Is Tuition Up? Look At All the 
Profs, NAT’L JURIST, Mar. 2010, at 40, available at http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/cypress/nat 
ionaljurist0310/#/40. 
 49. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 36. 
 50. See Interpretation 206-1, supra note 45, at 14. 
 51. Colleen A. Khoury, Ruminations on A Deanship, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 105, 107 (2002). 
2015] The Legal Academy Under Erasure 369 
higher education generally, making them more broadly informed decision- 
makers than are most faculty members about law school policies and priorities.52 
To be sure, under no circumstances should the democratic process of faculty 
governance be jettisoned in favor of autocratic or quasi-autocratic deans,53 but 
law schools may want to reconsider the allocation of decision-making authority 
between law school faculties and deans.  If the faculty does not approve of how 
the dean is steering the law school, then the faculty should not be reluctant to 
vote for the dean’s removal.54 
But critics like Professor Tamanaha go further and argue that the ABA should 
loosen or eliminate its control over legal education, which would make law 
professors and law schools more accountable to students and the 
profession.55  According to Professor Tamanaha, the ABA “ha[s] been subverted 
by legal educators to ratchet up their salaries and reduce their teaching loads,” 
and above all, to define a good legal education as requiring a three-year program 
of study in an academically-oriented institution (staffed mostly by full-time 
faculty) that supports faculty scholarship, thus shutting out more affordable law 
schools devoted to teaching rather than research. 56   To break the ABA’s 
monopoly over an accreditation process that promotes the interests of professors, 
these critics urge states to disregard ABA policies that allow “the ones being 
regulated . . . [to] writ[e] the rules,”57 and admit graduates of non-ABA law 
schools to practice.58 
                                                        
 52. See id. at 107 (stating “a dean does see the institution from a unique perspective—a sort 
of helicopter view from which one can see all the parts and how they work together and relate”). 
 53. Cf. Newton, supra note 27, at 73.  Newton suggests: 
[I]n order for systemic reform to occur, the model of governance will need to change to 
one analogous to the “corporate” model—a powerful executive who, while not 
omnipotent, does not require the consensus of . . . faculty members with respect to 
significant administrative matters such as hiring decisions, curriculum reform, and the 
like.  Such corporate governance is the norm at American medical schools. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. See Interpretation 206-1, supra note 45. 
 55. See In re Culver, slip op. at 9 (Mont., filed Feb. 2, 2002) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting); 
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 16‒17; Mathew D. Staver & Anita L. Staver, Lifting the Veil: An 
Exposé on the American Bar Association’s Arbitrary and Capricious Accreditation Process, 49 
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 74‒76 (2003). 
 56. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 18. 
 57. Id. at 36. 
 58. Id.  Professor Tamanaha cites with approval a dissenting opinion from the Montana 
Supreme Court in its denial of bar admission to a graduate of a school not accredited by the ABA, 
but accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges: 
[T]he monopoly of this private trade association to set standards for law schools increases 
the cost of legal education, burdens new members of the profession with debt that limits 
their options for professional and public service, hampers innovations in the area of legal 
education, discriminates against “working faculty” with practical professional 
experiences to share with their students, and discriminates against non-conventional 
students and minorities who do not meet the arbitrary admissions standards imposed. 
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The accrediting authority of the ABA can be traced back to the turn of the 
twentieth century,59 a time when lawyers were held in low esteem, the result of 
too many low-quality law schools staffed mostly by non-academic practitioners 
that were producing too many lawyers.60  In 1921, the ABA began to promulgate 
standards required for law school accreditation, and graduation from an ABA-
accredited institution was an eligibility condition most state bars adopted for 
admission to the bar.61  Yet, in 2013, lawyers continue to be held in low esteem, 
and there are still too many law schools and too many lawyers.  What is the 
proposed solution?  Allowing law schools to once again offer two-year 
vocational degree programs and graduates of non-ABA approved law schools to 
practice law. 
As discussed below, this Article vigorously disagrees with the notion that 
legal education should be put under erasure by reshaping the three-year law 
school curriculum into a two-year vocational program. 
II.  ACADEMY OR TRADE SCHOOL: EDUCATING OR JUST TRAINING LAWYERS? 
 
[T]he critique of legal education has a long pedigree, traversing the 
twentieth century and enduring through the present day. . . . [T]he 
nature of the critique has been remarkably consistent, focusing on the 
poor connection between traditional legal education and legal 
practice.62 
—Professor A. Benjamin Spencer 
 
“The customer is always right” may have worked for Marshall Field, 
but it is a prescription for disaster in legal education.63 
—Professor Brian Leiter 
 
A common complaint about legal education is that law schools have become 
divorced from the practical needs of students and the profession.  Such 
                                                        
Id. at 176 (quoting In re Culver, slip op. at 9 (Mont. Filed Feb. 2, 2002) (Trieweiler. J., dissenting)). 
 59. Staver & Staver, supra note 55, at 10‒11. 
 60. Id. at 21‒22. 
 61. Gerard J. Clark, Monopoly Power in Defense of the Status Quo: A Critique of the ABA’s 
Role in the Regulation of the American Legal Profession, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1009, 1014 
(2012); Staver & Staver, supra note 55, at 10‒11. 
 62. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1949, 2015 (2012). 
 63. Brian Leiter, A Different Take on the ABA Task Force Draft Report on the Future of Legal 
Education, BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REP. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leit 
er/2013/09/a-different-take-on-the-aba-task-force-draft-report-on-the-future-of-legal-education. 
html. 
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arguments are not new.64  Almost twenty-five years ago, former ABA President 
Talbot D’Alemberte observed that he “[could not] find many people who are 
that happy with legal education. . . . The profession is not benefiting, the students 
are not benefiting.  In whose interest are we running legal education?”65  Indeed, 
legal education has been debated almost since the founding of the Republic, and 
the contours of that debate are not much different today.  In the 1800s and early 
1900s, people questioned whether formal legal training was necessary for bar 
admission, and whether legal education should be practical or academic in 
nature.66 
This persistent criticism that legal education is insufficiently practical has 
greater potency in the current economic environment, with critics arguing that 
the current academic model of legal education cannot continue.67  The bar has 
renewed the criticisms made by AALS President Thomas Morgan over two 
decades ago, when there also was the concern “that young lawyers coming into 
their firms require too much training” and that firms were unwilling “to 
undertake the burden of sharing ‘nuts and bolts’ insights about law practice.”68  
Once again, law firms are unwilling to train new attorneys,69 apparently feeling 
little responsibility for doing so, either to the profession or young lawyers.70 
This Article discusses proposals that would effectively put the legal academy 
under erasure by making it vocationally, rather than academically, oriented, an 
anti-intellectual approach condemned by the President of the AALS almost forty 
years ago.71  There was a time when law schools thought it their mission to 
provide a liberal arts education in the law to broaden students’ horizons, 
cultivate critical thinking, and prepare lawyers to contribute to American 
                                                        
 64. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S 
TO THE 1980S 119‒23, 162 (1983); John Nivala, From Bauhaus to Courthouse: An Essay on 
Educating for Practice of the Craft, 19 N.M. L. REV. 237, 259 (1989); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 
723-28 (discussing persistent criticisms that law schools fail to teach practical skills). 
 65. Talbot D’Alemberte, Talbot D’Alemberte on Legal Education, 76 A.B.A. J. 52, 52 (1990). 
 66. Thomas D. Morgan, A Defense of Legal Education in the 1990’s, 48 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1, 2‒4 (1991). 
 67. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 160, 181‒82; Henderson, supra note 1, at 462 (stating 
that “[t]he demand for our core product—traditionally educated law school graduates—is 
collapsing”). 
 68. Morgan, supra note 66, at 11. 
 69. See Henderson, supra note 1, at 462 (noting the unwillingness of clients to be billed for 
the work of “lawyers in training”). 
 70. This trend is not limited to the legal job market.  Employers in many fields are refusing 
to provide the kind of on-the-job training and apprenticeships they once did, insisting that 
universities now provide such vocational job-skills training.  Employers are doing so to maximize 
profits by shifting their training costs to universities.  See PETER CAPPELLI, WHY GOOD PEOPLE 
CAN’T GET JOBS 71‒75 (2014). 
 71. Francis A. Allen, The Prospects of University Law Training, 63 A.B.A. J. 346, 346 (1977). 
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democracy. 72   But today it is the market that rules, 73  and “nuts-and-bolts” 
vocational training for law practice is what both students and employers appear 
to want.74   According to a recent Time/Carnegie Corporation survey, forty 
percent of Americans think the goal of higher education should be to train 
                                                        
 72. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 720‒21 (discussing early legal education).  Indeed, the 
early law schools were established with the mission of educating future political leaders through a 
liberal arts curriculum.  Id. (citing treatises on history of legal education). 
 73. See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW 
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 181‒206 (2004) (discussing how 
universities are under considerable pressure to generate revenue and respond to market forces, with 
many configuring their programs and curricula in ways that will maximize their appeal to 
prospective students, employers, and donors).  Universities are adopting business models and 
becoming entrepreneurial, even in non-professional disciplines.  For example, classics departments 
may offer trips to Greece or Rome for alumni or the general public.  Id. at 27.  Fine arts colleges 
are shifting resources away from fields not having economic payoffs, like studio art, to those having 
greater market demand, like graphic arts.  Id.; see also Rebecca Flanagan, The Kids Aren’t Alright: 
Rethinking the Law Student Skills Deficit, 2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 131, 150–51 (2015).  Flanagan 
notes that 
[o]ne of the more troubling aspects of the customer orientation of students is an increased 
focus on the extrinsic outcomes of a college degree . . . . The consumer orientation, and 
corresponding extrinsic motivations, “radically alters” the fundamental nature of 
education.  Students no longer see themselves as partners in a relationship designed to 
further growth; consumer orientation frames the relationship between student and teacher 
as customer and service provider, with the customer expecting satisfaction.  Students 
who view education as an economic transaction become preoccupied with their GPA, 
sacrificing “deeper, critical analytical learning” in pursuit of a credential they can 
exchange on the market. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Although some argue that viewing education as a business model is 
“entirely reasonable” to ensure that colleges “prove their worth” to their student-customers, this 
proposition overlooks the risk that colleges acting solely as service providers “los[e] their value as 
places where young people enter as adventurous adolescents and from which they emerge as 
intellectually curious adults.”  Andrew Delbanco, Illiberal Arts: What’s the Point of College? Two 
Books Consider the Question from Different Perspective, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2013, at BR22 
(reviewing JEFFREY J. SELINGO, COLLEGE (UN)BOUND: THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND 
WHAT IT MEANS FOR STUDENTS (2013)).  For a discussion of the many negative effects on teaching 
and higher education of the business and student-as-consumer models of higher education, see Joel 
Thomas Tierno, How Many Ways Must We Say It?, ACADEME 11 (Nov.‒Dec. 2014) and Miguel-
Martinez-Saenz & Steven Schoonover, Jr., Resisting the “Student-As-Consumer” Metaphor, 
ACADEME 15 (Nov.‒Dec. 2014). 
 74. See ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 8 (discussing “the rise of consumer 
outlook”).  According to Jeffrey J. Selingo, education has turned into a business where students are 
the customers purchasing a service, which creates “a major power shift in the classroom from 
professors to the students.”  SELINGO, supra note 73, at 20.  As a result, students “regard their 
professors as service providers, just like a cashier at the supermarket or a waiter in a restaurant.”  
Id.  Course evaluations, for example, “look eerily similar to customer satisfaction surveys from 
department stores.”  Id.  This shift incentivizes professors to grade leniently so as to curry favor 
with students in their course evaluations, and to entertain, rather than teach, students in order to 
satisfy the student-customer.  See id. at 21; see generally Richard E. Redding, Students’ Evaluations 
of Teaching Fuel Grade Inflation, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1227 (1988) (arguing, based on the 
empirical evidence, that course evaluations cause professors to inflate grades). 
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students in specific job skills and eighty three percent believe that curriculums 
are too divorced from career training goals.75  Only twelve percent think the goal 
should be to develop critical thinking skills, only eleven percent to help students 
develop life values, and only six percent to become better-informed citizens.76 
It is no wonder, then, that studies find today’s university students to be 
“academically adrift,” 77  with dumbed-down curricula and limited student 
engagement with learning.  In a survey of students entering four-year colleges 
in 2012, eighty-eight percent said that a chief reason they pursued higher 
education was to get a better job, seventy-nine percent said it was to get training 
for a particular career, and seventy-five percent said they wanted to make more 
money.78  But seventy-three percent also said they wanted to get a good general 
education, eighty-three percent wanted to learn more about what interested them, 
and fifty-one percent strived to become more cultured. 79   Nonetheless, 
policymakers and universities have responded to what they perceive as the 
market demand for a laser-like focus on job skills, as seen in recent mandates 
from the U.S. Department of Education that schools adopt “learning objectives 
and assessment schemes that gauge whether students are learning the skills 
required for particular jobs.”80  As a result, many law schools, including elite 
schools, have been rethinking their curricula to focus more on practical 
lawyering skills.81 
Yet, as Professor Dan Solove of George Washington University Law School, 
in defense of traditional, three-year law programs, explains: 
[s]ome assume that the goal of a legal education should be to teach 
people practical skills so that when they leave law school, they can 
                                                        
 75. See Josh Sanburn, Higher-Education Poll, TIME (Oct. 18, 2012), http://nation.time.com/ 
2012/10/18/higher-education-poll/?pcd=teaser. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROSKA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED LEARNING ON 
COLLEGE CAMPUSES 3‒5 (2011) (discussing the disconnect between today’s students and the 
traditional model of education). 
 78. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Education Department Releases College Scorecard to 
Help Students Choose Best College for Them (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/education-department-releases-college-scorecard-help-students-choose-best-colleg; A 
Profile of Freshmen at 4-Year Colleges, Fall 2012, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 19, 2013, 
http://chronicle.com/article/A-Profile-of-Freshman-at/140387. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Press Release, supra note 78.  The College Scorecard, a website launched by the 
United State Department of Education, provides statistics concerning a school’s “cost, graduation 
rate, loan default rate, average amount borrowed, and employment.”  Id.  But see Ann Schoebelen, 
The Jury Is Out on the New College Scorecard, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 25, 2013, available 
at http://chronicle.com/article/The-Jury-Is-Out-on-the-New/137531/ (detailing experts’ criticisms 
of the new scorecard). 
 81. See, e.g., Anne Cassidy, Strategic Planning: Rethinking the Future of Legal Education, 
GEO. L. MAG., Spring‒Summer 2013, at 31‒32 (discussing Georgetown Law Center’s Strategic 
planning council meeting to improve the school’s practicum experience). 
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start practicing law like a pro.  I don’t agree.  []  We are training people 
who will be in profound positions of power—future lawyers, judges, 
politicians, policymakers and so on.  It is important for all of society 
that these individuals be given a legal education that consists of more 
than just taking a few key classes and rushing off into the practice of 
law.  Law school is, for many, one of the few times that they reflect 
more broadly on the law, on justice, on how the law ought to be, on 
what works and doesn’t work well in the legal system.  It is a chance 
to learn about the history of law, the philosophy of law, law and 
literature, law and sociology, law and economics, and more.  I believe 
that these things make students be better lawyers—wiser, more 
creative, more well-rounded.  When we train lawyers, we’re training 
people who will be shaping our society, and I think it is imperative 
that their legal education be a robust extension of a liberal arts 
education, not simply a trade school education.82 
A law school is not only responsible for teaching practical skills so that 
employers do not have to bear the cost of training new associates.  Law schools 
share the collective responsibility to produce lawyers capable of contributing 
meaningfully to public discourse, society’s civil institutions, policymaking, and 
the democratic process.  This is especially true given the influence lawyers have 
in society today. 83   Professor Tamanaha quotes Professor Solove with 
disapproval, however, emphasizing that lower-ranked law schools are not 
training society’s leaders.84  Yet, since the founding of the Republic, lawyers 
have dominated state legislatures (seventeen percent of legislators are lawyers) 
and the U.S. Congress (fifty-four percent of Senators and thirty-six percent of 
Representatives are lawyers, most of whom graduated from law schools not 
ranked in the top fifty), and lawyers play significant policymaking roles in 
government agencies and many private organizations.85  And, of course, judges 
are lawyers, many whom did not graduate from top law schools.86 
                                                        
 82. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 26‒27 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Prof. Dan Solove, George Washington University).  Similarly, employers would probably prefer 
their employees to have taken courses in technical writing or digital media rather than courses in 
Shakespeare or nineteenth-century British poetry.  Do we want our college graduates trained only 
in the former and uneducated in the latter? 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Catherine Rampell, First Thing We Do, Let’s Elect All the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 
2012, 1:37 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/first-thing-we-do-lets-elect-all-
the-lawyers/. 
 86. See, e.g., Mission Statement, GOV’T & PUB. SECTOR LAWYERS DIV., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/government_public/about_us.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) 
(discussing the mission of public sector attorneys). 
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One can imagine the critics’ response: a liberal arts education is inappropriate 
in professional school,87 or a liberal arts education is fine for students at elite 
schools, but everyone else only needs the most immediate, practical, and 
efficient education possible.  But, medicine, economics, psychology, and 
education are also professions, yet these academic disciplines provide 
substantial theoretical and interdisciplinary training to their students.88  They 
recognize that “there is nothing so practical than as a good theory,”89 since it 
provides the descriptive and analytical framework for the deductive problem 
solving, creative-thinking, and problem-solving flexibility necessary to confront 
new problems across a range of practice contexts.90  A legal education centered 
primarily on practical skills leaves students incapable of returning to the 
foundational jurisprudential understandings needed when grappling with novel 
legal problems and cases.  Elitist and profoundly dismissive of students at non-
elite schools, Professor Tamanaha’s approach implies that these students will 
not achieve the sorts of careers requiring them to fashion novel and creative 
approaches to legal problems.  It also establishes a caste system among the bar, 
with two types of lawyers having two different legal educations—one academic 
and one vocational—an outcome not favorable for clients and the legal 
profession.91  Incorporating liberal arts education into legal education makes 
students at any law school better lawyers—“wiser, more creative, more well-
rounded”92 critical thinkers about the law best prepared to serve the clients and 
causes they represent.  Such an education incubates the development of critical 
thinking, sound judgment, and an appreciation for intellectual and cultural 
                                                        
 87. Dana M. Levitz, So, You Think You Want to Be a Judge, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 57, 71‒72 
(2008). 
 88. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 27. 
 89. See, e.g., KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL 
PAPERS 168‒69 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1952); Jennifer S. Bard, Teaching Health Law, 36 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 841, 843 (2008) (comparing medical education to legal education). 
 90. For a discussion of the methodological value of teaching legal theory, see Jonathan 
Crowe, Reasoning From the Ground Up: Some Strategies for Teaching Theory to Law Students, 
21 LEGAL EDUC. R. 49, 55‒62 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2382356. 
 91. See, e.g., Bard, supra note 89, at 841, 843.  Consider medical education.  Although 
medical schools vary in selectivity and the extent to which their faculties are research- versus 
practice-oriented, all graduates of American medical schools receive essentially the same education 
and mostly the same core courses and range of clinical experiences.  See id.  Narrowly and 
technically trained physicians will suffice in instances where a patient presents routine problems.  
However, a broadly trained physician, advanced in her specialty and capable of thinking critically 
and creatively about medical problems, is required when a patient presents multifaceted or unusual 
problems.  Pity the client with a complex or unusual legal problem whose lawyer is trained only as 
a legal technician in one or two discrete areas of the law. 
 92. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting Prof. Dan Solove). 
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diversity.93  By grappling with foundational issues and theory in a variety of 
relevant core disciplines, students develop the critical-thinking skills necessary 
to apply insights from the humanities and social sciences to legal problems, 
something clients very much need if they are to receive the most effective 
representation. 
Even if the overriding goal is to better train students for practice, it is 
vocationally myopic to narrow the academic experience.  I applaud teaching the 
skills needed for law practice.  Students need more of that, provided it is 
appropriately integrated with relevant theoretical, doctrinal, and 
interdisciplinary knowledge.  In the long-run, lawyers who can think creatively 
about the law will distinguish themselves as great lawyers, able to fashion 
creative approaches to solving legal problems, novel legal arguments, and deal 
structurings.  Lawyers commit a disservice to their clients and the courts when 
they are unable to draw upon relevant legal theory or insights from other 
disciplines in providing policy rationales to support their proferred legal doctrine 
or interpretation.94  As Professor Nancy L. Schultz observes, effective lawyers 
not only know the skills of the trade, such as how to write a motion, draft 
particular contract clauses, take a deposition, or avoid conflicts of interest, but 
also must be able to “critically analyze the utility, effectiveness, and social 
implications of legal doctrine and procedure; integrate nonlegal approaches 
into the legal problem-solving process; and synthesize and build original legal 
theories, frameworks, and systems.”95 
Developing such a knowledge foundation and skill set requires not only 
technical skills training, but also a liberal arts education in the law that “mak[es] 
students work and think in ways and at levels of engagement and intensity that 
are characteristic of graduate students elsewhere in the academy. . . [so] that 
doctrine, theory, skills, and interdisciplinary perspectives on law all constituted 
it in integral and equally-important ways.”96  Should we return to a time when 
law school focused on “nuts-and-bolts” practice skills in a two-year curriculum, 
or will legal education move forward to provide students with the robust 
                                                        
 93. See James A. Arieti, Liberal Arts and the Human Soul, RECORD (Hampden-Sydney C., 
Hampden-Sydney, Va.), June 2011, available at http://www.hsc.edu/The-Record/2011-June/Liber 
al-Arts-and-the-Human-Soul.html (arguing that a traditional liberal arts education in the 
humanities, sciences, and social sciences uniquely develops the “psychic goods”—virtues such as 
“courage, justice, moderation, wisdom . . . and a respect for the dignity of all one’s fellow human 
beings and for the world of nature”). 
 94. See Arnold H. Loewy, Why I Authored a Criminal Law Casebook, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 661, 662 (2013) (providing an example where defense counsel, when asked by the court, was 
unable to offer a policy rationale to support the legal standard for proximate cause that counsel had 
argued for on behalf of his client). 
 95. Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 60 
(1992) (emphasis added). 
 96. Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility of 
Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 537 (2002). 
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academic experience needed to successfully navigate the complexities of law 
practice in the twenty-first century? 
III.  NO PLACE FOR NOSTALGIA IN LEGAL EDUCATION 
 
I believe that law schools would probably be wise to think about being 
two years instead of three years.97 
—President Barack Obama 
 
[T]he law-school-in-two-years proposal rests on the premise that law 
school is, or ought to be, a trade school. . . .  It is not that.  It is a 
school preparing men and women not for a trade but for a 
profession—the profession of law.98 
—U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
 
Ever since the ABA and AALS successfully established the three-year model 
of legal education in the early 1900s,99 it has been argued that two years of law 
school is sufficient, 100  an argument renewed by today’s reformers. 101   In 
proposing a two-year law degree emphasizing practice skills,102 reformers are 
nostalgic for American legal education circa one hundred years ago when law 
schools were vocational schools.  Some go even further,103 suggesting that legal 
                                                        
 97. See Lattman, supra note 14, at B3 (quoting President Barack Obama’s statement at a 
town-hall meeting at Binghamton University in New York). 
 98. See John Schwartz, Evaluating That Third—Boring—Year, N.Y. TIMES 25 (Education 
Life, Aug. 3, 2014) (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia’s commencement address at William and Mary 
Law School). 
 99. Campos, supra note 1, at 219‒20. 
 100. See, e.g., The Carrington Report, reprinted in HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, 
NEW DIRECTORS IN LEGAL EDUCATION app. A, at 138‒39 (1972) (noting that law professors have 
questioned the efficacy of the third year). 
 101. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 20‒27 (including a discussion of the history of the third 
year of law school); Campos, supra note 1, at 220 (stating that “[a]t a recent national conference 
on legal reform, no one among a group of more than one hundred legal academics was willing to 
defend the proposition that the third year of law school represented a justifiable investment”); 
Samuel Estreicher, The Roosevelt-Cardozo Way: The Case for Bar Eligibility After Two Years of 
Law School, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599‒600 (2012); Debra Cassens Weiss, Two-
Year Law School Was a Good Idea In 1970, and It’s a Good Idea Now, Prof Tells ABA Task Force, 
A.B.A. J. (Feb. 10, 2013, 1:36 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/two-year_law_schoo 
l_was_a_good_idea_in_1970_and_its_a_good_idea_now/ (citing the testimony of law professors 
before the ABA Task Force). 
 102. See ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 31 (suggesting that the ABA consider 
reducing the amount of instruction time required for a J.D. degree and “[s]eriously [c]onsider 
[p]roposals to [r]educe the [a]mount of [l]aw [s]tudy [r]equired”). 
 103. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 23‒24. 
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training can be delivered entirely at the undergraduate level followed by a 
professional apprenticeship, which was the predominant educational model in 
the United States over a century ago.104  But this model was abandoned when it 
became obvious that an apprenticeship alone provided insufficient training 
because it did not teach the thinking and analytical skills necessary for solving 
complex legal problems. 105   Even a recent Stanford Law School graduate 
questioned the need for a legal education to practice law, and claims that three 
years of law school churns out “over-educated” lawyers.106 
There is clearly the sense among many, particularly law students, 
practitioners, 107  and even some law professors, 108  that two years of legal 
education is sufficient to prepare new generations of lawyers for the 
complexities of law practice in the twenty-first century.  Yet, as Professor 
Thomas Morgan observes, even during three years of law school “there is not 
nearly enough time in law school to prepare a new lawyer to meet all the 
challenges that he or she will face in a practice.”109 
Indeed, the current program of legal education produces under-trained, not 
over-educated, lawyers.  Doctrinal education alone need not be three years long, 
but law schools should provide a more robust academic experience that teaches 
the essential doctrine of first year courses, exposes students to a reasonable range 
of specialty areas, and teaches the applications of other disciplines relevant to 
law (e.g., accounting, economics, psychology, and quantitative methods, but 
also some philosophy of law, comparative jurisprudence, and law and the 
humanities).  Further, schools should integrate skills training throughout the 
curriculum.  Achieving these pedagogical goals requires a minimum of three 
years of law school.  In all likelihood, it requires four years of study, as is the 
case in medical education today. 
To be sure, any proposal for a four-year J.D. curriculum is a non-starter in a 
time when tuition costs are already exorbitant and reformists are pushing hard 
in the direction of a two-year curriculum.110  Yet, confronting the ideal informs 
our consideration of what should not be done.  Law schools are currently failing 
                                                        
 104. See Campos, supra note 1, at 220‒21. 
 105. See STEVENS, supra note 64, at 3. 
 106. Vijay Sekhon, The Over-Education of American Lawyers: An Economic and Ethical 
Analysis of the Requirements for Practicing Law in the United States, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
769, 769‒70 (2007).  Mr. Sekhon postulates that “[a]ttorneys probably do not need to know the 
basic legal doctrines in all of the subjects taught in law school in order to be effective advocates. . 
. . [I]t is difficult to argue that the benefits of three years of law school justify its significant 
economic cost.”  Id. at 780‒81 (internal citation omitted). 
 107. See Kaplan Bar Review Survey, supra note 9 (reporting that sixty-three percent of recent 
graduates think that law school can be shortened to two years). 
 108. See Campos, supra note 1, 219‒20; Weiss, supra note 101. 
 109. Morgan, supra note 66, at 13. 
 110. See Weiss, supra note 101. 
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to provide the theoretical and interdisciplinary training, integrated with the 
necessary practice skills that students require to be competent attorneys in 
today’s very complex practice environment.  At a minimum, then, law schools 
should not be entertaining the erasure of what little theoretical and 
interdisciplinary training there is in legal education today by reducing law school 
to just a two-year program of study, putting the J.D. degree on par with Master’s 
degrees. 
A.  An (Un)Realistic Turn for Legal Education 
 
The need for an understanding of other disciplines—history, 
psychology, sociology, and economics—becomes plain after even the 
most cursory examination of the range of problems lawyers and judges 
face.111 
—Professor Nancy L. Schultz 
 
American legal education does not do enough to teach how law works 
in the context of the social, political, and economic world that is 
inhabited by lawyers’ clients.  Teaching the law without its context . . 
. is like teaching the Fourteenth Amendment without the Civil War.112 
—Faculty Members of the Massachusetts School of Law 
 
Arguing that law had become so “entangled” with political and social 
questions, Judge Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit described a system of law that was no longer an 
“autonomous discipline,” but rather an interdisciplinary one, drawing on insights 
from the sciences, social sciences, and humanities.113  Nearly thirty years later, 
                                                        
 111. Schultz, supra note 95, at 65 (internal citation omitted). See also Brannon P. Denning, 
The Yale Law School Divisional Studies Program, 1954‒1964: An Experiment in Legal Education, 
52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 369 (2002) (quoting REPORT ON THE COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM AND 
PERSONNEL, YALE LAW SCHOOL (May 6, 1946) (concluding that it is “self-evident that law is one 
of the social sciences, and that the law will be most fruitful and critical when skills and perspectives 
of history, economics, statistics, psychology, political science, sociology, and psychiatry are fully 
and effectively used”). 
 112. Andrej Thomas Starkis et al., Meeting the MacCrate Objectives (Affordably): 
Massachusetts School of Law, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 240‒41 (1998) (discussing Massachusetts 
School of Law’s development of a series of “law in context” courses). 
 113. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962‒1987, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 761, 768‒73 (1987).  Posner highlights the contributions of economics, philosophy, 
and public choice theory to legal theory and policy, and states: 
[the] confidence in the ability of lawyers on their own to put right the major problems of 
the legal system has collapsed. . . .  [D]ue partly to the rise of other disciplines to positions 
where they can rival the law’s claim to privileged insight into its subject matter. . . .  [such 
380 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:359 
this same lack of autonomy is more apparent and more pronounced in everyday 
law practice.114  Because the law includes concepts from other disciplines that 
provide ways to critically analyze legal problems and policies in their social 
context,115 lawyers ignore other disciplines at their peril.  As was recognized by 
the early twentieth-century legal realists,116 the law “is truly interdisciplinary in 
the sense of being without discipline. . . . [T]he causes that come before the 
lawyer, the pathology, madness, and injuries that get litigated can call upon any 
number of skills of apprehension and determination.”117 
When lawyers confront a legal question, they must investigate and develop 
relevant facts.  The social and business sciences often enlighten those facts and 
their legally relevant social context. 118   Law itself is an empty vessel—“a 
profession of process”119—a system for ordering, regulating, and mediating 
human affairs that must rely on other disciplines for the knowledge upon which 
legal doctrine and practices are shaped. 120   As Professor Peter H. Schuck 
bemoans, the “single greatest failing” of legal education is that “we do not teach 
our students how to handle facts—how to find, interpret, prove, and rebut 
them.”121  Once law students master the basics of legal reasoning, which can be 
                                                        
as] the continuing rise in the prestige and authority of scientific and other exact modes 
of inquiry. 
Id. 
 114. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Ideal Law School for the 21st Century, 1, UC IRVINE L. REV. 1, 
17‒18 (2011) (describing the UC Irvine Law School’s interdisciplinary first-year Legal Profession 
course that teaches students about, inter alia, “the economics of the profession, the psychology of 
being a lawyer, and the legal profession from a law and society perspective”). 
 115. See Denning, supra note 111, at 367, 369‒70. 
 116. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Speaking Science to Law, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
289, 317 (2013) (citing Oliver Wendell Homes, The Path of the Law, in AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM 15 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas Reed, eds.) (1993)). 
 117. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986), in JOHN MONAHAN & LAUREN 
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS 328 (8th ed. 2014) (discussing the early 
legal realist movement); see also Peter Goodrich, Intellection and Indiscipline, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 
460, 468 (2009) (arguing that “courts should treat social science research relevant to creating a rule 
of law as a source of authority rather than as a source of facts”). 
 118. Carl N. Edwards, In Search of Legal Scholarship: Strategies for the Integration of Science 
into the Practice of Law, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 1, 2‒3 (1998). 
 119. See id. at 30. 
 120. See Richard E. Redding, Reconstructing Science Through Law, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585, 585 
(1999); see also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Twenty-Five Years of Social Science in Law, 
35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 72, 74‒80 (2011) (noting that since the 1985 publication of the first edition 
of their casebook, Social Science in Law, “American courts’ reliance on social science research was 
often confused and always contested,” but “[i]n the past several years, it has become more difficult 
to find a Supreme Court constitutional decision implicating an empirical question in which at least 
one side did not cite to social science research”). 
 121. Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 323, 325 (1989). 
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accomplished in the first half of law school, it becomes more important for 
students to learn about the factual and policy context in which they will be 
working than it is to learn more rules of process.122  Along with an insufficient 
appreciation for the psychology and sociology of working with clients, the main 
problem with legal education is a lack of attention to the substantive problems 
the law seeks to resolve and regulate. 
It may be argued that college, not law school, is the appropriate forum to 
expose students to other disciplines.  Unfortunately, few lawyers have an 
undergraduate background in legally relevant disciplines, and few 
undergraduate courses address the legal applications of those disciplines.123  
Even if legally relevant undergraduate courses were offered and taken, it is 
unlikely that such courses would offer content at the level of sophistication 
necessary for lawyer training.  Moreover, undergraduate programs today leave 
many graduates without a sufficiently well-rounded liberal arts education in the 
essential and generalizable critical thinking, communication, and creative skills.  
We should not further narrow and vocationalize their college education by 
focusing it on legally-relevant courses and issues, rather than allowing pre-law 
students to instead pursue a broad liberal arts education.124 
Still, some feel that interdisciplinary education in law school is a luxury.125  
Professor Anthony D’Amato insists that there is barely enough time in three 
years of law school to teach what students must know about legal doctrine, and 
that, because attorneys “can simply hire the appropriate [expert]” for any case, 
“many advocates of interdisciplinary collaboration between a lawyer and a 
social scientist do not seem to sufficiently appreciate the fact that the usefulness 
of the social scientist begins after the lawyer has read, sorted, and categorized 
                                                        
 122. See, e.g., CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., supra note 5, at 156‒57.  Susan Meyers, Associate 
General Counsel at Hyundai Capital American, said: 
I thought I was very well prepared with my Harvard law degree to start practice.  One of 
my first assignments was to review a package of loan documents for a bank client . . . .  
I started reading the document and realized that I didn’t know what the borrower’s 
business was, I had no idea what the assets described involved, I didn’t know what a 
financial condition was, or what EBITDA ratios were . . . .  [I]t is important to learn and 
be knowledgeable about your client’s business and the industry, almost more so than 
knowing the law. 
Id. 
 123. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW 53‒54 (1999); Richard E. Redding & Daniel C. Murrie, Judicial Decision Making About 
Forensic Mental Health Evidence, in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: EMERGING TOPICS AND 
EXPANDING ROLES 683, 685 (Alan M. Goldstein ed., 2007) (reviewing evidence that most lawyers 
have little or no training in science and few understand basic statistical concepts). 
 124. For the same reasons, we should not shorten students’ college education by offering “3 + 
3 programs” that allow students to complete college and law school in just six years by shaving off 
one year of college, as some schools are now doing.  See Mangan, supra note 1. 
 125. Anthony D’Amato, The Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education 4‒5 (Bepress Legal 
Repository, Working Paper No. 1901, Dec. 2006), http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1901. 
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the cases.”126  On the contrary, practicing lawyers regularly research the law in 
an area in which they are unfamiliar.  But without at least some knowledge of 
other legally relevant disciplines, lawyers may fail to recognize when those 
disciplines might be useful in resolving the client’s legal problem, and when 
they ought to retain an expert.  Ample social psychological research has shown 
that people often fail to recognize their own incompetencies and knowledge 
deficiencies. 127   Although interdisciplinary courses cannot survey every 
potential circumstance under which another discipline might become useful in a 
legal case, these courses can provide students with an introductory foundation 
and representative sampling of practical applications to the law, raising students’ 
awareness of its legal applications.128 
The usefulness to lawyers of psychological research on factors affecting the 
accuracy of eyewitness testimony serves to illustrate the value of 
interdisciplinary training.129  Especially in criminal cases, juries tend to give 
eyewitness testimony great weight, which often can make or break the 
case. 130   Yet, a compelling body of psychological research shows that 
eyewitnesses frequently misperceive or misremember what they witnessed; 
many jurors, and even judges, do not understand the potential variables that 
affect the accuracy of eyewitnesses’ perceptions and memories.131  Accordingly, 
uninformed jurors are not in a position to accurately assess the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony.132  Unless exposed to the relevant research on eyewitness 
reliability in a law school course or elsewhere, attorneys may fail to investigate 
the particulars of their case for the presence or absence of these eyewitness 
reliability factors, and may fail to consider that they should consult an expert on 
eyewitness testimony and possibly call him or her as an expert witness at trial. 
The social and business sciences, namely accounting, economics, quantitative 
methods, and psychology, are useful to practicing attorneys for developing case 
facts, understanding the extralegal context of cases, and counseling clients.  
                                                        
 126. Id. at 12. 
 127. See generally David Dunning et al., Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own 
Incompetence, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 83, 83‒85 (2003), available at 
http://jstor.org/stable/20182845 (discussing their findings); Ethan Zell & Zlatan Krizan, Do People 
Have Insight into Their Abilites? A Metasynthesis, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 111, 111‒13 (2014), available 
at http://pps.sagepub.com/content/9/2/111. 
 128. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAUREN WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASE AND 
MATERIALS 328 (8th ed. 2014) (entitled “Social Science Used to Make Law”) (describing the 
applications of social science to determine case facts, make new law, provide relevant context for 
juries and legal decision-makers, and to plan the litigation of a case). 
 129. See Kate A. Houston et al., Expert Testimony on Eye Witness Evidence: In Search of 
Common Sense, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 637, 638, 649‒50 (2013). 
 130. See Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification, 20 CURRENT DIRECTONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 24, 24‒25 (2011), available at http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/20/1/24. 
 131. See Houston et al., supra note 129, at 637‒39, 648. 
 132. See supra notes 127‒31 and accompanying text. 
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Accounting is the language of business.133   Without a proper foundation in 
accounting, an attorney practicing in any business field may be excluded from 
many meaningful conversations, limited in his or her understanding of relevant 
financial documents, and branded as hopelessly unsophisticated.  Additionally, 
accounting teaches fundamental ethical principles about when safeguards are 
required. Many ethical issues are solved “on the natural” if the attorney 
understands basic accounting rules.134  Economics is the study of efficiencies, 
trade-offs, moral hazards, and incentives, which is what much of the law 
concerns itself with—selecting those legal policies and doctrines that best 
achieve market efficiencies and incentivize desired behavior.135  Consequently, 
“economic thinking dominates contract, commercial, bankruptcy, antitrust, 
corporate, and securities law and related fields . . . [and] is also influential . . . in 
tort, criminal, and property law and civil procedure.”136  Economics is at the 
heart of cost-benefit analysis, which is essential to the administration of 
environmental law, for example. 
Psychology, the study of human behavior, has many insights to offer law and 
legal practitioners: guidance in litigating a cases, such as jury selection, crafting 
jury instructions, and jury persuasion; counseling clients, such as therapeutic 
jurisprudence; determining case facts, such as consumer surveys of trademark 
confusion or risk assessments of defendants’ future dangerousness; or providing 
relevant context to assist the finders of fact, such as research on the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony or the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis.137  For example, 
basic principles of forensic psychology may guide a criminal defense attorney 
or prosecutor in dealing with mentally-ill defendants, competency concerns, and 
                                                        
 133. Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in Corporate Law, 55 
BUFF. L. REV. 537, 569 (2007). 
 134. Joan T.A. Gabel et al., Evolving Regulation of Corporate Governance and the 
Implications for D&O Liability: The United States and Australia, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 365, 
388‒89 (2010) (noting the rise in governmental supervision and regulation of the auditing 
profession). 
 135. See HENRY N. BUTLER & CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR 
LAWYERS 4‒5 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that “individuals, businesses, and other economic actors . . . 
[generally] seek to maximize their ‘self-interest.’ . . . The rational maximizer responds to changes 
in incentives in a predictable manner.”); see, e.g., David A. Weisbach, in The Future of Law and 
Economics: Essays by Ten Law School Scholars, REC. ONLINE (U. Chi., Chi., Ill.), Fall 2011, 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall11/lawandecon-future (discussing the use of 
economics in the resolution of climate change-related issues). 
 136. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, in The Future of Law and Economics: Essays by Ten Law School 
Scholars, REC. ONLINE (U. Chi., Chi., Ill.), Fall 2011, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/maga 
zine/fall11/lawandecon-future. 
 137. For a thorough discussion of the role the social sciences play in the legal process, see 
MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 128, at v‒vi.  See generally Richard E. Redding, How Common-
Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal Research, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 
107 (1998) (outlining “a ‘common sense psychology’ approach to psycholegal research and 
advocacy”). 
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mental health evidence at sentencing hearings; these issues will arise more 
frequently in practice than many of the doctrines taught in criminal law courses, 
such as necessity, duress, and impossibility. 138   Furthermore, psychological 
research has a long history of use in legal reform, including the school 
desegregation cases, death penalty jurisprudence, and affirmative action law.139 
Legal practitioners must also be conversant in the quantitative and scientific 
methods of the business and social sciences, whether as litigators understanding 
scientific evidence140 or as business attorneys understanding basic accounting 
principles. 141   Accordingly, law students should be required to take one 
quantitatively-oriented course, such as accounting, law and economics, or 
statistics for lawyers.142  George Mason University School of Law, for example, 
offered a required course in “analytical methods for law” that surveyed the 
legally relevant basics of decision analysis, theory, statistics, accounting, 
finance, microeconomics, law and economics, and economic and financial issues 
relating to contracts.143 
The humanities may also contribute to legal education.  The Carnegie 
Foundation Report on Legal Education emphasized the need for law students to 
understand their professional identity and purpose as lawyers: 
(1) what are the core values of the legal profession?; (2) what does it 
mean, morally and ethically, to be a lawyer?; (3) how should lawyers 
shoulder the mantles of power and authority in their professional 
                                                        
 138. See Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal 
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 52‒53 (2006) [hereinafter Redding, 
The Brain-Disordered Defendant]; Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential to Teach About Mental 
Health Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How to Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 
407‒08 [hereinafter Redding, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law] (2004). 
 139. See Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
567, 603 (2003) (citing Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (2002); 
William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629 (2001)); 
MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 128, at ch. 4 (entitled “Social Science Used to Make Law”). 
 140. Federal trial judges must assess the reliability of proffered scientific evidence.  See 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); see also Margaret A. Berger, The 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 12‒13 (3d 
ed. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman3DOI.pdf/$file/sciman3D 
OI.pdf (discussing the implications of Daubert).  Lawyers must be prepared to litigate these issues, 
which requires that they have a basic understanding of scientific methods and statistics.  Thus, the 
second chapter of Monahan and Walker’s casebook, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 128, at 
33, is a social science methodology “primer” for law students. 
 141. See Newton, supra note 27, at 94‒95 (emphasizing that corporate lawyers “must speak 
‘the language of business’ in order to provide their clients effective assistance”). 
 142. See id. 
 143. Francesco Parisi, Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Legal Education, 6 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 347, 350‒51 (2009).  See also Howell E. Jackson, Analytical Methods for Lawyers, 53 J. LEG. 
EDUC. 321, 322‒24 (2003) (describing the “Analytical Methods for Lawyers” course and casebook 
offered at Harvard Law School). 
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lives?; and (4) what does it mean to “flourish” as a lawyer and how, if 
at all, is that different than flourishing as a person?144 
Enlightenment on these matters will not be found in either the Model Rules 
of Professional Responsibility or in legal ethics opinions.  The humanities, 
including law and literature, provide an ideal vehicle for students to engage such 
questions, as does law and religion, particularly in religiously-affiliated law 
schools.145  Courses based in the humanities equip students to confront the value 
choices and ethical dilemmas they will face in practice, because “[l]iterary 
accounts of lawyers’ work—and more general literature that deals with themes 
such as truth, virtue, and justice—helps readers to understand not only the 
responsibilities of lawyers but also the social exigencies to which lawyers must 
respond.”146 
A recent study published in Science found that reading fiction improves a 
person’s ability to understand the perspectives, emotions, and needs of others.147  
For example, the lessons of Dickens’ Bleak House,148 Dostoevsky’s Crime and 
Punishment,149 Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird,150 Kafka’s The Trial,151 Grisham’s 
A Time to Kill,152  and Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter,153  provide valuable 
extralegal perspectives on the power of legal norms and the legal system (and 
the souls caught up in it), often conveying deeper truths about the legal system 
than the law does itself, thereby “offer[ing] a very direct preparation for the 
challenges of [practicing law].”154  Literature can also be used as a pedagogical 
device.  For example, Professor Martin H. Pritkin uses Arthur Miller’s play, The 
                                                        
 144. R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education 
Now, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1515, 1525 (2012); see also Jacob Soll, The Economic Logic of the 
Humanities, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1501850 
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 145. Cassidy, supra note 144, at 1525 n.59 (stating that the professionalism retreat offered to 
students at Boston College Law School “is loosely based on St. Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises”). 
 146. Mark Sanders, Law and Literature: Resources for Illinois Attorneys and Law Students, 
87 ILL. B.J. 109, 109 (1999). 
 147. See David Comer Kidd & Emanuele Castano, Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory 
of Mind, 342 SCIENCE 377, 377‒79 (2013). 
 148. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1853). 
 149. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Constance Garnett trans., Random 
House 1956) (1866). 
 150. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Grand Cent. Publ’g 1960). 
 151. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Tribeca Books 2011) (1925). 
 152. JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO KILL (Doubleday 1989). 
 153. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Dover Publ’n 1994) (1850). 
 154. Arieti, supra note 93; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 21‒22, 389 
(3d ed. 2009) (arguing literature can provide lawyers with unique insights on jurisprudential 
questions). 
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Crucible, to teach students how to think strategically about evidentiary issues at 
trial.155 
[I]t is crucial that we not abandon the humanistic foundations of 
education in favor of narrow, technical forms of teaching intended to 
give quick, utilitarian results.  Those results are no substitute for the 
practices, sometimes painstaking, of inquiry and critique that enhance 
students’ ability to appreciate and understand the world around 
them—and to respond innovatively to it.  A reflexive, pragmatic 
liberal education is our best hope of preparing students to shape 
change and not just be victims of it.156 
By studying how other disciplines approach sociological problems, lawyers 
are better prepared to question whether the best solution is a legal one, 157 
whether the best alternative is the legal doctrine or remedy presently on the 
books, and whether the social and behavioral assumptions underlying legal 
doctrines and procedures comport with empirical reality or merely reflect 
untested common-sense assumptions.  Jurisprudence, critical theory, and the 
social sciences provide insights into how the law functions, how the law is 
perceived to function, how the law is failing to function, or how the law ought 
to function in society.  As Professor Pierre Schlag cautions, such “disruptive 
questions” are harder to come by when legal education is confined to the 
“internal perspective” of the law.158 
Since the days of legal realism, it has been recognized that empirical questions 
are at the heart of law, which is replete with doctrines and practices that fail to 
reflect social reality.159  A narrow focus upon understanding established doctrine 
from the insider perspective of the legal system itself reifies lawyers as “appliers 
of law rather than as creators of law” who are little more than “apologist[s] and 
technician[s] for established institutions and things as they are,” and “confines 
legal education to the ‘what is’ and neglects the promise of ‘what might be.’”160  
Instead, law schools should equip lawyers to “relentlessly question the validity 
of what they think they know, accept received truths with skepticism, and 
                                                        
 155. Martin H. Pritikin, Can Law and Literature Be Practical? The Crucible and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 687, 703 (2012) (discussing the evidentiary lessons that the 
interrogation scenes in The Crucible can provide to law students). 
 156. Michael S. Roth, The False Promise of “Practical” Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
May 19, 2014. 
 157. See generally PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW 5‒6 
(1998) (arguing that we tend to cast all social problems in legal terms requiring a legal solution). 
 158. See Pierre Schlag, Anti-Intellectualism, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1995). 
 159. See Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant, supra note 138, at 108‒10 (discussing 
how the behavioral assumptions underlying much of law are inconsistent with social science 
research findings). 
 160. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 247, 254‒55, 262 (1978). 
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wonder with every [legal problem] what improved understanding or novel 
[solution] is just around the corner.”161 
Thus, “course[s] in legal history, sociology, institutions, hermeneutics, theory 
and sociology . . . give[] . . . students places to stand outside the habituation of 
and by doctrine or law.”162  Only then may students “gain the purchase necessary 
to fashion it, from the beginning, in other images”163 to advance the interests of 
their clients and to act as legal policymakers or reform advocates.  Courses in 
jurisprudence and comparative law provide students with useful alternative 
approaches to various legal doctrines and procedures and instill a critical 
mindset whereby students question law’s foundational assumptions and 
practices, the necessary starting point for change. 164   Unlike law students, 
students in other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, film studies, 
history, and English, graduate with a grounding in the competing foundational 
schools of thought associated with their discipline.  These disciplines find such 
a grounding fundamental, a prerequisite for creative problem solving, yet few 
law students receive such an education.  How many lawyers can talk 
meaningfully about competing schools of jurisprudence, different approaches to 
providing procedural justice, or about the meaning of “justice” itself?165 
A word of caution is required, however.  If interdisciplinary courses are to be 
successful as a requirement for law school graduation, professors teaching such 
courses must be mindful that students will be asking the “so what” question.  
Students will wonder what this has to do with law practice, or even more 
pragmatically, with passing the bar.  Thus, professors should teach these courses 
in an applied context, clearly illustrating how the other disciplines are useful in 
solving legal problems.  Even then, some students will feel that learning more 
legal doctrine, in lieu of the interdisciplinary exposure, is of greater value and 
interest to them,166 particularly because many law students are somewhat phobic 
of quantitative disciplines such as accounting, statistics, or economics. 167  
                                                        
 161. MOLLY COOKE, DAVID M. IRBY & BRIDGET C. O’BRIEN, EDUCATING PHYSICIANS: A 
CALL FOR REFORM OF MEDICAL SCHOOL AND RESIDENCY 30 (2010) (applying this approach to 
medical students). 
 162. Pether, supra note 96, at 538. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 513; see also Cramton, supra note 160, at 249 (recognizing a need for attorneys to 
distinguish between desired results and reality). 
 165. See, e.g., Goodrich, supra note 117, at 468. 
 166. See Redding, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law, supra note 138, at 421, 425 
(reporting results of a survey of students in a first-year criminal law course).  The survey found that 
while many students reacted positively to practice-relevant insights from the social sciences, a 
substantial minority of students reacted negatively because they felt such issues were irrelevant as 
these topics are not tested on the bar examination, and they found legal doctrine to be more 
important.  Id. at 422‒26. 
 167. See Leonard J. Long, Basic Economics for Aspiring Lawyers: A Review of Richard A. 
Ippolito, Economics for Lawyers, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 219, 219 (2009) (noting that prospective 
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Nonetheless, if taught properly, most students will react positively to the 
interdisciplinary insights bearing on legal problems and everyday lawyering.168 
B.  Teaching Knowledge and Skills Together 
 
Lighthouse, him no good for fog.  Lighthouse, him whistle, him blow, 
him ring bell, him flash light, him raise hell; but fog come in just the 
same.169 
—Dean William L. Prosser 
 
[We should] offer[] in legal education a complexity that matches the 
complexity of the legal world in which our students will function after 
they graduate. . . . [The notion of] “skills” versus “substance”—ought 
to be banished from our thinking.170 
—Professor Nancy L. Schultz 
 
The 2007 Carnegie Foundation Report,171 the 1992 ABA Report on Legal 
Education (MacCrate Report),172 and even the early 1914 and 1921 Carnegie 
                                                        
law students can meet the criteria for admission “having no aptitude for science or mathematics, 
and having had no exposure to accounting, psychology, political science, statistics, literature, 
philosophy, or other useful subjects including economics”); Robert J. Rhee, Specialization in Law 
and Business: A Proposal for A JD/“MBL” Curriculum, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 37, 45‒46 (2013) 
(stating that most incoming law students “do not come to law school with a basic knowledge of 
business”). 
 168. In teaching my first-year criminal law course, I frequently discussed psychological 
concepts relevant to understanding criminal behavior, defenses to crimes, and the effective 
representation of criminal defendants.  Comments from students illustrated that they understand the 
benefit: 
[Psychology] is such an important issue in terms of defenses, witnesses, and determining 
what punishment will or will not be effective.  I think it is crucial to proper representation. 
. . . The study of law should not be limited to learning the trade of lawyering [as] the 
ability to understand and apply the social policies behind the law aid in serving our 
clients.  I will work in the U.S. Attorney’s Office this summer and the materials regarding 
mental disorder and mental illness will be food for thought. 
Redding, Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law, supra note 138, at 424‒25.  A student also 
commented that “[i]t gave [her] a much broader perspective on our criminal justice system, and 
what is wrong with it.”  Id. 
 169. William L. Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 257, 257 (1948‒49) (quoting 
a Native American saying as a metaphor for American legal pedagogy in 1948). 
 170. Schultz, supra note 95, at 57. 
 171. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 22 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]. 
 172. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, TASK FORCE 
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Foundation studies173 all lambasted law schools for failing to teach legal practice 
skills.  The MacCrate Report identified ten skills 174  and four professional 
values175 that every law graduate should have.176  Still, law schools generally do 
a poor job of teaching these skills and professional values. Responding to the 
renewed call for such training, many schools now require students to take an 
upper-level transactional or litigation skills course, applied capstone course, or 
a clinic or externship.177  State bars are also mandating skills training in law 
school.  For example, the California State Bar, attempting “to foster the 
development of professional competency skills,” now proposes that candidates 
for bar admission complete at least fifteen units of upper-level coursework or 
“participat[e] in Bar-approved externships, clerkships or apprenticeships for 
courts, governmental agencies, law firms or legal service providers.”178 
But requiring students to take only a few skills or clinical courses is 
insufficient, and only emphasizes the false dichotomy between doctrine and 
practical skills. Rather, skills must be integrated throughout the curriculum, 
along with theory and doctrine, as each is necessary to the other.  Nothing is 
more useful than a good theory, which provides the conceptual framework for 
deductive and inductive problem-solving when deploying one’s skills.  Most 
errors in problem-solving occur because the person’s  underlying theory or 
“mental model” is faulty or incomplete.  Moreover, the key feature 
differentiating the expert from the novice is that “[t]he expert’s knowledge is 
less context-specific or situation-specific in that he/she can generalize abstract 
principles in order to solve problems across a range of situations.”179 
                                                        
ON SCH.: NARROWING THE GAP 5, 266 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT] (demonstrating 
the failure of law schools to recognize the importance of teaching professional skills). 
 173. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
TEACHING 68‒69 (1914); ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 48‒49 
(1921). 
 174. Problem solving; legal analysis and reasoning; legal research; fact investigation; 
communication; counseling; negotiation; litigation and alternative dispute resolution; organization 
and management of legal work; and recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas. 
 175. Provision of competent representation; striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality; 
striving to improve the profession; and professional development. 
 176. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 172, at 138‒41. 
 177. See Chart of Legal Education Reform (2011) (on file with the Catholic University Law 
Review). 
 178. STATE BAR OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS REGULATION REFORM: PHASE I 
FINAL REPORT 24 (2013), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/bog/bot_Ex 
ecDir/ADA%20Version_STATE_BAR_TASK_FORCE_REPORT_(FINAL_AS_APPROVED_
6_11_13)_062413.pdf. 
 179. Richard E. Redding, Metacognitive Instruction: Trainers Teaching Thinking Skills, 3 
PERF. IMPROV. Q. 27, 30 (1990). 
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Skills are the mechanism by which legal knowledge is applied and understood 
in context, and skills practice provides students with feedback on how their 
knowledge should be interrogated, synthesized, and refined.180  Active learning 
best motivates and engages students, since they can see how the theory is useful, 
and skills application is the ultimate form of “learning by doing.”181  However, 
research in cognitive psychology indicates that skill development requires 
continual practice across a range of legal contexts and problems, particularly if 
the skills are to transfer to the complex cases students will handle in practice.182  
Accordingly, to be effective, skills training must be neither too little, too early 
(e.g., a few add-on skills components in first-year courses), nor too little, too late 
(e.g., a few skills courses or clinics in the last year of law school), but must be 
integrated into all three years of law school. 
Consider legal writing skills, as taught through first-year legal writing courses 
and the several seminar or drafting courses law schools now require.183  In 
comparing students’ writing during the first year of law school with their writing 
at graduation, it is often the case that though they have mastered the nuts-and-
bolts of legal writing, there has been little improvement in their writing style, 
which is something that requires continued practice and refinement.184  To truly 
develop students’ writing skills, law schools must incorporate writing exercises 
into courses throughout the curriculum,185 and these writing exercises should 
                                                        
 180. Id. at 27‒28. 
 181. Id. at 31‒33. 
 182. Don Peters, Mapping, Modeling, and Critiquing: Facilitating Learning Negotiation, 
Mediation, Interviewing, and Counseling, 48 FLA. L. REV. 875, 885–86 & n.20 (1996) (citing 
GORDON H. BOWER & ERNEST R. HILGARD, THEORIES OF LEARNING 77‒78 (5th ed. 1981)); Don 
Peters & Martha M. Peters, Maybe That’s Why I Do That: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator, and Learning Legal Interviewing, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169, 173 n.15 
(1990) (stating that “sufficient repetitive practice opportunities is critically important to skill 
development”); see Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Legal 
Problem Solving, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 149, 149 (2004) (concluding that “basic knowledge of 
substantive legal doctrine is a necessary prerequisite to learning effective legal practice”); Redding, 
supra note 179, at 30‒32 (1990) (reviewing research on the transferability of skills problem); see 
also Yasmin Sokkar Harker, “Information Is Cheap, but Meaning Is Expensive”: Building 
Analytical Skill into Legal Research Instruction, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 79, 95 (2013) (noting that 
“literature from cognitive and educational psychology offers an enormous amount of information 
instructors can use and apply, especially in the area of analytical skill development and learning”); 
see generally ROBERT E. HASKELL, TRANSFER OF LEARNING (2001). 
 183. See, e.g., Legal Writing at Duke Law, DUKE L. SCH., https://law.duke.edu/curriculum/leg 
alwrit (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (providing an overview of the different types of legal writing 
courses). 
 184. Susan Hanley Kosse & David T. Butleritchie, How Judges, Practitioners, and Legal 
Writing Teachers Assess the Writing Skills of New Law Graduates: A Comparative Study, 53 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 80, 87 (2003). 
 185. A word of caution about teaching skills: often when professors attempt to incorporate 
skills training into their courses, the pedagogical focus becomes the nuts-and-bolts mechanics 
(glorified paralegal training or “soft skills” only) rather than deeper problem-solving skills.  
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also serve to develop other practice skills.  For example, a course in business 
associations might require students to draft corporate bylaws or a shareholder 
agreement based on a mock term sheet, with the students representing the parties 
and negotiating the terms with one another. 
To teach knowledge and skills in an integrated fashion, law schools must 
develop a competency-based curriculum, whereby we teach the knowledge and 
skills required of attorneys and test for these expert-typical competencies in 
applied contexts.  Legal doctrine and skills, when taught in a manner divorced 
from the larger social and factual context and case history, is not an effective 
pedagogy.186   Reflecting on her time teaching at an Australian law school, 
Professor Penelope Pether observed that educators “actually tested what it was 
[they] wanted students to learn, skills and content both, and as a result courses 
were generally continually assessed using a range of assessment models. . . .  
[S]tudents wrote and otherwise applied what they were learning a lot, in many 
genres, everywhere in the curriculum . . . .”187  Similarly, the California Bar 
proposes restructuring the bar examination to test practical competencies “that 
are found among the best and most successful lawyers” rather than “standardized 
test-taking skills and knowledge of legal doctrine.”188  We should adopt the same 
approach throughout legal education. 
To do so effectively, we must first “identify the knowledge, skills, behaviors, 
and attributes of highly successful [attorneys] . . . and then work backwards,” 
using the identified knowledge and skills as course learning objectives.189  Two 
recent studies identifying the generic skills, such as listening skills, creative 
problem solving, and emotional intelligence, that are characteristic of successful 
attorneys are helpful, but only a rudimentary beginning.190  Educational and 
                                                        
Students may “become adept at workplace procedures without developing deeper conceptual 
understanding of the rationale for the practices they are learning.”  See COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, 
supra note 161, at 223 (discussing a similar problem in medical schools). 
 186. See Spencer, supra note 62, at 2036‒38.  Professor A. Benjamin Spencer observes: 
[T]he case-dialogue method often strips disputes from their context and emphasizes 
formal and procedural issues over other moral or personal factors that might bear on 
reaching a more complete appraisal of the justice of an outcome . . . . Omitted is any 
consideration of the underlying record, including documents, evidence, pleadings, trial 
transcripts, trial court rulings, and the like, or the raw client narratives and other facts 
that faced the practitioner at the pre-litigation, problem-solving phase of the 
representation, in favor of a retrospective view that stymies the development of the “legal 
imagination” . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted) 
 187. Pether, supra note 96, at 507. 
 188. STATE BAR CAL., supra note 178, at 13. 
 189. Henderson, supra note 1, at 496. 
 190. See Neil W. Hamilton & Verna E. Monson, Ethical Professional (Trans)Formation: 
Themes From Interviews About Professionalism with Exemplary Lawyers, 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 921, 946‒51 (2012); Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: 
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cognitive psychologists should be recruited to conduct sophisticated and 
comprehensive studies of lawyering skills to identify the knowledge, mental 
models, and skills of expert attorneys in various practice areas.191 
Such studies, which have been conducted in other fields, examine how experts 
do their work, using a technique known as “cognitive task analysis.”192  This 
technique employs experimental techniques, such as cognitive interviewing, 
psychological scaling, performance modeling, and error analysis, to identify the 
underlying knowledge base, mental models (high-level conceptualizations of 
problems and tasks providing the framework for solving problems), planning 
and attention allocation skills, and decision-making and problem-solving 
strategies differentiating between those more skilled versus less skilled at 
various tasks.193  The goal is to determine how expertise develops over time, 
how to expedite learning, and how to identify the developmental antecedents to 
such expertise, including the beginning and intermediate knowledge and skill 
sets prerequisite to moving to higher expertise levels.  In sum, 
a cognitive task analysis [of lawyering] should include: (a) the 
development of measurement instruments for assessing individual 
abilities as well as changes in the knowledge base; (b) the 
identification of task components; (c) the identification of the 
conceptual and procedural knowledge required for similar 
components; (d) the identification of differences between novices and 
experts, as well as intermediate states of knowledge; and (e) the 
specification of the learning conditions which best facilitate progress 
from one knowledge state to the next.194 
Curriculum designers can use the findings from a cognitive task analysis to 
optimally structure and sequence instruction in a way that will promote students’ 
development of the expert-typical cognitive structures and skills; and, to provide 
individualized instructional feedback about discrepancies between the expert-
typical knowledge structures, mental models, and problem-solving strategies 
and the students’ own. 
                                                        
Broadening the Basis for Law School Admissions Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 620, 629, 
630 tbl.1 (2011). 
 191. Joan M. Ryder & Richard E. Redding, Integrating Cognitive Task Analysis into 
Instructional Systems Development, 41 EDUC. TECH. RES. & DEV. 75, 75‒76 (1993).  See, e.g., 
Seamster et al., Cognitive Task Analysis of Expertise in Air Traffic Control, 3 INT’L J. AVIATION 
PSYCHOL. 257, 257‒58 (1993). 
 192. See COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS 3‒4 (Jan Marten Schraagen, Susan F. Chipman & 
Valerie L. Shalin eds. 2000). 
 193. See, e.g., Seamster et al., supra note 191, at 257‒58; see generally COGNITIVE TASK 
ANALYSIS, supra note 192, at 3‒6 (providing an introduction to cognitive task analysis); Redding, 
supra note 179, at 27 (discussing metacognition); Ryder & Redding, supra note 191, at 75 (noting 
a shift in job demands from requiring behavioral responses to sophisticated cognitive skills). 
 194. Redding, supra note 179, at 36‒38. 
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IV.  THE MEDICAL SCHOOL MODEL: THE RIGHT PRESCRIPTION FOR LEGAL 
EDUCATION? 
 
One limitation is the casual attention that most law schools give to 
teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity of actual 
law practice.  Unlike other professional education, most notably 
medical school, legal education typically pays relatively little 
attention to direct training in professional practice.  The result is to 
prolong and reinforce the habits of thinking like a student rather than 
an apprentice practitioner . . . .195 
—Authors of the Carnegie Report 
 
The arguments against changes in law school curriculum are 
remarkably similar to those raised against changing the medical 
school curriculum.196 
—Professor Jennifer S. Bard 
 
It is instructive to compare law schools to medical schools, because both are 
professional schools preparing students for practice that have been criticized for 
failing to do so.  In the early twentieth century, “medical education in the United 
States was faced with many of the problems that critics feel are confronting legal 
education today: an over-production of practitioners . . . proliferation of 
professional schools, insufficient financing, and inadequately trained graduates 
entering the profession.” 197   The 1910 Carnegie Foundation’s evaluation 198 
hugely impacted medical education, with medical schools adopting its 
recommendation that medical education be more clinically oriented.199 
Early American legal education similarly was clinically oriented, a structure 
borrowed from the British apprenticeship model, with many states requiring 
lengthy apprenticeships for admission to the bar.200  Eventually legal education 
turned away from this approach, prompted by Harvard Law Professor 
Christopher Langdell’s introduction of the notion that law was a “science,” best 
                                                        
 195. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 171, at 188. 
 196. Jennifer S. Bard, Teaching Health Law: What We in Law Can Learn from Our Colleagues 
in Medicine about Teaching Students How to Practice Their Chosen Profession, 36 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 841, 847‒48 (2008). 
 197. Robert M. Hardaway, Legal and Medical Education Compared: Is It Time for a Flexner 
Report on Legal Education?, 59 WASH. U.L. REV. 687, 687‒88 (1981). 
 198. A. Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada, BULL. 4 (THE CARNEGIE 
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 1910). 
 199. Hardaway, supra note 197, at 697‒99. 
 200. Id. at 699‒700. 
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mastered by classroom case study,201 and today law is about the only profession 
that does not require some form of apprenticeship experience before becoming 
licensed to practice.202   An early twentieth-century critic of American legal 
education observed that while medical schools trained their students by having 
expert physicians model medical decision-making across hundreds of patients, 
law schools exposed students only to particular kinds of cases—those resulting 
in appellate litigation—found in casebooks.203  The critic explained: 
The medical student is taught how to do it right in the first place.  He 
watches the operations of eminent surgeons.  He sees top-ranking 
physicians examine living patients. . . . [H]e does things not merely 
once, as a law class visits a courthouse, but literally hundreds and 
hundreds of times . . . . And at the same time he is being taught the 
theory of medicine.  He learns to read x-rays, not by reading in a book 
about a patient dying because someone did not read an x-ray correctly, 
but by reading hundreds of x-rays under expert supervision.”204 
Until recently, the first year of medical school taught students205 the basic 
medical sciences, such as anatomy, microbiology, and biochemistry, in large 
lecture classes.206   In 1998, the American Association of Medical Colleges 
(AAMC) reformed medical school curricula to better link theory to practice and 
facilitate “discovery learning.”  Medical schools shifted to problem and case-
based pedagogies whereby basic sciences are taught in the context of their 
clinical relevance (e.g., cancer cell biology and treatment rather than basic cell 
biology), with clinical experiences and competency-based assessments 
incorporated throughout the four years of medical school.207  Today, medical 
students are taught the basic sciences as they inform the medical applications, 
and students receive considerable practice exposure via clinical rotations where 
the applications of basic sciences to medical practice are stressed.208  Such an 
integrative pedagogical model is rare in legal education, which still focuses on 
doctrine at the expense of jurisprudential theory and legally-relevant insights 
                                                        
 201. The 1912 ABA Committee on Legal Education noted that a significant advance had been 
“[t]he recognition of the superiority of the law school over the office preparation or the Bar.”  Henry 
A. Rogers et al., Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, in REPORT 
OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 595, 602‒04 
(1912). 
 202. CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., supra note 5, at 155. 
 203. Hardaway, supra note 197, at 706. 
 204. Id. at 706‒07 n.115. 
 205. See Bard, supra note 89, at 844 (stating that the first two years of medical school looked 
like the current law school model). 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. at 844‒46 (stating that “almost all medical schools . . . now incorporate some 
version of problem-based learning (PBL)”); see also COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, supra note 161, at 
80‒81 (stating that “PBL is the essence of ‘discovery learning’”). 
 208. See Bard, supra note 89, at 845‒46. 
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from other disciplines, and which often teaches clinical skills divorced from the 
practical applications of theory.209 
The alarms raised by the 2010 Carnegie Foundation Report on medical 
education should resonate with legal education reformers, who call for similar 
reforms.210  The report lambasted medical schools for failing to teach students 
how to think creatively about medical problems, for over-emphasizing factual 
knowledge, and for failing to prepare them adequately for practice.211  The report 
urged schools to do a better job of linking foundational scientific knowledge to 
practice.212  Similarly, the 2007 Carnegie Report on legal education urged law 
schools to “mediate between the claims for legal theory and the needs of 
practice, in order to do justice to the importance of both while responding to the 
demands of professional responsibility.”213   To accomplish these goals, law 
schools should consider adapting the medical school model to legal education, 
crafting a  curriculum that: (1) teaches foundational doctrine in the core subjects 
during the first year and a half of law school, but in an applied context whereby 
students practice skills through case simulations and problem-solving exercises; 
(2) exposes students to a reasonable range of specialty areas via elective courses 
during the second and third years, in a fashion that integrates doctrine with skills; 
(3) requires students to take a certain number of courses from a menu of 
interdisciplinary courses focusing on practical applications to law practice, such 
as jurisprudence or critical theory, accounting, economics in law, psychology or 
criminology in law, quantitative methods for lawyers, and courses in law and the 
humanities; and (4) provides students with clinical experiences early in law 
school, while devoting much of the final year of law school to a series of clinical 
rotations that exposes them to different practice areas. 
                                                        
 209. Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-Realist 
Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 357‒59 (2008).  See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 171, 
at 10 (finding that “careful analysis of intelligent practice reveals a more intricate relationship 
between theory and practice . . . an understanding that is still poorly appreciated in the academy as 
a whole”). 
 210. Compare COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, supra note 161, at 23 (finding “instances of 
foundational knowledge poorly linked to experience”), and Richard B. Gunderman, A Prescription 
for What Ails Medical Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 20, 2013, at A60 (lamenting that 
“[m]any medical students gain remarkably little practical, hands-on experience”), with Jean R. 
Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating A Common Sense 
Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 727‒28 (1996) (noting 
the overwhelming criticism “on law schools’ alleged failure to convey a variety of practical skills”). 
 211. COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, supra note 161, at 23. 
 212. Id. at 23‒30; see also Richard B. Gunderman, A Prescription for What Ails Medical 
Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://search.proquest.com/docview/14738617 
08/1A851A99E5E843AFPQ/1?accountid=147762 (citing surveys of physicians, many of whom 
complained that medical residents lack basic practice skills). 
 213. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 171, at 12. 
396 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:359 
The structure of legal education in the twentieth century essentially rendered 
the first year of law practice, the fourth year of law school.  Today, however, 
law firms resist the cost of training first-year associates in basic practice skills, 
and demand that law schools assume much of that responsibility.214  But most 
law schools do not require students to complete any clinical experience for 
graduation,215 most law students do not enroll in clinics,216 and externships, 
where students often receive little meaningful supervision and frequently 
perform largely clerical and low-level tasks, may be of questionable value.217  
By contrast, clinical rotations give students the opportunity to meaningfully 
experience different practice areas.  These hands-on training experiences also 
equip students to make more informed career decisions about which practice 
specialties to pursue.  Just as medical schools offer clinics in each of the major 
specialties, law schools could offer community clinics in a range of practice 
areas, such as the clinic courses offered at New York Law School.218 
Yet, as Professor Jennifer S. Bard explained, “it is difficult to teach someone 
how to do something that you yourself do not know.”219  Professor Brent E. 
Newton asks us to “[i]magine a medical school faculty dominated by professors 
with minimal experience in treating real patients. . . .  [H]ow [then] can we allow 
the equivalent to occur in the context of legal education?”220  A cadre of adjunct 
faculty, who bring other benefits to a law school, can assist full-time faculty in 
managing and supervising the clinics.221   Adjunct professors bring valuable 
practice expertise that many full-time faculty members, who only practiced 
briefly with a large firm or government agency, lack in comparison.222  Adjunct 
                                                        
 214. Robert J. Condlin, “Practice Ready Graduates”: A Millennialist Fantasy, 31 TOURO L. 
REV. 75, 95 (2014). 
 215. Spencer, supra note 62, at 1949. 
 216. Id. at 2018 (citing data from the National Association for Law Placement).  However, the 
ABA is considering a proposal requiring law school students to complete at least six credit hours 
of clinical, externship, or simulation-based courses.  See Karen Sloan, Panel Near Decision on Law 
Students’ Bar Exam Passage Rates, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/ 
id=1202641943246/Panel-Near-Decision-on-Law-Schools-Bar-Exam-Passage-Rates. 
 217. See ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE 
BRAVE NEW ECONOMY xiv‒xv (2012). 
 218. See Clinics, N.Y. L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/academics/office_of_clinical_and_experi 
ential_learning/clinics/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 219. Bard, supra note 89, at 844. 
 220. Newton, supra note 27, at 113. 
 221. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2013‒2014, Interpretation 304-3(e), 
24‒25 (2013) [hereinafter Interpretation 304-3(e)], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abal 
publications/misc/legal_education/standards/2013_2014_final_aba_standards_and_rules_of_proc
edure_for_approval_of_law_schools_body.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 222. See Walter Bumphus, Partner with the Private Sector, TIME (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/10/18/8-ideas-to-improve-higher-education/slide/partner-with-the-priv 
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professors can also share their practitioner’s real-world insights on curricular 
matters and faculty scholarship.223 
Insofar as clinical education is concerned, Arizona State University Law 
School, New York Law School, and Washington and Lee University School of 
Law perhaps come the closest to adopting something akin to the medical school 
model.224  Arizona State University Law School created its own law firm staffed 
by clinical and adjunct faculty, law students, and newly minted graduates,225 just 
as medical schools do with associated university teaching hospitals.226  At New 
York Law School, students are required to complete a two-semester course, 
working with “trained actors with whom students practice their interviewing, 
fact-gathering, and counseling skills.”227   In addition, the third year of law 
school is entirely devoted to “three nine-week full-time clinical rotations” 
available through their twenty-six clinics.228  Washington and Lee University 
School of Law has transformed the third year of law school into a series of skills 
emersion, experiential, and clinical courses.229 
However ideal the medical education model may appear for teaching 
knowledge and skills together, there are significant limitations to the value of 
                                                        
ate-sector/; see also ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 25 (stating that law schools alone 
cannot equip students with all the practice competencies and that law firms and other legal 
organizations must help train new lawyers). 
 223. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, BEST 
PRACTICES REPORT ON THE USE OF ADJUNCT FACULTY 10, 35 (2011) [hereinafter BEST 
PRACTICES REPORT ON THE USE OF ADJUNCT FACULTY].  See also CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., 
supra note 5, at 167 (setting forth Professor Cassidy’s comment that “[w]e need to have really 
experienced lawyers and judges, who are senior in their career, join faculty on a short-term basis, 
for example, a ‘distinguished visitor from practice,’ we’ll call it”). 
 224. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, To Place Graduates, Law Schools Are Opening Firms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, at A14 (discussing Arizona State University Law School); The Third Year in 
Detail, WASH. & LEE. U. SCH. L., http://law.wlu.edu/thirdyear (last visited May 1, 2013). 
 225. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, supra note 224 (discussing Arizona State University Law 
School). 
 226. See, e.g., Steven Dowshen, What’s a Teaching Hospital?, KIDSHEALTH.ORG (Apr. 2013), 
http://kidshealth.org/PageManager.jsp?dn=KidsHealth&lic=1&ps=107&cat_id=20253&article_se
t=60611; What is a Teaching Hospital?, BARNABAS HEALTH (last visited Nov. 3, 2014), 
http://www.barnabashealth.org/Medical-Education/What-is-a-Teaching-Hospital-.aspx. 
 227. New York Law School Named One of 20 Most Innovative Law Schools, N.Y. LAW SCH. 
(Aug 8, 2012), http://www.nyls.edu/news-and-events/new-york-law-school-named-one-of-20-
most-innovative-law-schools/. 
 228. Why NYLS? The City is Our Classroom, N.Y. L. SCH. 6‒8, http://www.nyls.edu/admissio 
ns/wp-content/uploads/sites/144/2014/09/ADMS-Viewbook-2015-16-F-City-Classroom.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2014) [hereinafter NYLS BROCHURE]. 
 229. CHAPMAN L. REV. SYMP., supra note 5, at 159‒62 (setting forth Washington and Lee 
University School of Law Professor James Moliterno’s description of the school’s innovative third-
year education program, a series of twelve experiential courses that “put the students in the role of 
lawyer”).  See Washington and Lee’s New Third Year Reform Leading the Way in Legal Education 
Reform, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L., http://law.wlu.edu/thirdyear (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). 
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clinical rotations in legal education.  Medical training programs are designed 
with the following considerations in mind: “What are the clinical experiences 
that a newly minted physician in this specialty should have encountered under 
supervision?  How many instances should she have seen?  What level of 
proficiency or sophistication should she have attained?”230   During clinical 
rotations in the last two years of medical school, students are exposed to 
thousands of cases ranging in complexity and patient populations, often assisting 
the supervising physicians with a dozen or more patients daily.231  Further, 
medical students rounding at teaching hospitals will be exposed to patients 
presenting complex and challenging medical problems because these patients 
are often referred to the teaching hospitals of medical schools.232 
In contrast, law school clinics provide students with only a handful of cases, 
due to the time commitment required to handle most legal matters.233  Law 
clinics also usually handle relatively simple cases (e.g., drafting a simple will, 
filing a no-fault divorce, mediating a small claims dispute, trying misdemeanor 
cases) involving particular kinds of legal issues (most clinics do not, for 
example, handle international business transactions, corporate law, real estate 
transactions, or felony criminal cases). 234   Although clinics will introduce 
students to real cases, law students are exposed to a very limited range of client 
populations and case types that are not representative of the diverse populations 
and complex cases they will encounter in practice.  In terms of the number and 
range of clients and cases and the complexity level of these cases, the clinical 
training law schools are able to provide pales in comparison to the clinical 
training provided by medical schools.  For these reasons, the kind of work 
students do in existing law school clinics may have little transferability to their 
later law practice. 
Consider also the opportunity cost involved in the time taken away from 
teaching theory, doctrine, and interdisciplinary perspectives on the law.  This is 
a huge cost; young lawyers will acquire lawyering skills in practice but are not 
likely in practice to study legal theory or critical perspectives on law and the 
                                                        
 230. See COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, note 161, at 237. 
 231. See id. at 239 (discussing the heavy workload of medical school students during their 
internship rotations). 
 232. FLEXNER: 75 YEARS LATER, A CURRENT COMMENTARY ON MEDICAL EDUCATION 27 
(Charles Vevier ed. 1987) (“[T]eaching hospitals tend to attract the most complex cases; the 
patients are sicker and have a higher rate of complications.”); see also COOKE, IRBY & O’BRIEN, 
supra note 161, at 164 (discussing how university teaching hospitals “provide general and 
specialized clinical care to some of the most severely ill and injured”). 
 233. See Bard, supra note 89, at 846; R. Sam Hoover, A Physician Becomes An Attorney With 
Little Advice: A Case Study, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 43, 44 (2010) (stating law school clinical 
programs do not compare, experience wise, to medical school programs). 
 234. See, e.g., NYLS BROCHURE, supra note 228, at 6; Fact Sheets, ARIZ. STATE UNIV. LAW 
SCH., https://www.law.asu.edu/clinics/TheClinicalProgram/ClinicFactSheets.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015). 
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legal system, making law school the only time for such an education.  How many 
legal skills do students actually acquire, retain, and generalize after working on 
a few relatively simple cases in just one or two semester-long clinics?  To be 
sure, there is a pressing need for graduates to be “practice ready.”235  But we 
must consider whether this is a realistic goal given the limited number and range 
of skills we are likely to impart to students in a few clinical or skills-based 
courses and via the few, usually time-consuming, skills exercises we can 
feasibly incorporate into traditional courses. 
It may appear that the solution to these intrinsic problems in clinical legal 
education is to adopt the model of medical schools, which have fee-charging 
teaching hospitals and outpatient clinics staffed by a cadre of full-time clinical 
faculty.236  Perhaps in collaboration with the private sector, law schools might 
operate like law firms, offering reduced-fee legal services staffed by tenure-track 
supervising faculty who are valued as highly as their non-clinical 
counterparts.237  But this would only partially solve the range and complexity of 
cases problem, since full-paying clients having more complex cases or business 
law cases are not likely to retain the services of the school’s firm unless the 
school can staff it with distinguished supervising practitioners, as medical 
schools do in their teaching hospitals (with patient insurance covering much of 
the cost).  The problem of exposure to only a small number of cases would 
remain, though not if new graduates obtain their first year of practice experience 
in the law school firm, as a kind of legal internship similar to a medical 
internship.  Unfortunately, given the structure of legal education and the legal 
services market, the viability of law-school affiliated firms is questionable; most 
previous attempts to establish such firms have failed.238 
V.  MARGINALIZING SCHOLARSHIP 
 
The high quality and distinctiveness of American legal education are 
based largely on the work of career, full-time faculty who engage fully 
in the law school’s teaching, scholarship, and service missions.  Full-
time faculty should be experts in their fields and continue to engage in 
scholarship that makes them even more accomplished. . . . The 
scholarship and public service of career, full-time faculty do not 
merely supplement their teaching role.  Both scholarship and public 
                                                        
 235. But see Robert Condlin, “Practice Ready Graduates”: A Millennialist Fantasy, U. of 
Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-48 (Nov. 18, 2014) (challenging the notion that 
law schools can produce “practice-ready” graduates). 
 236. See, e.g., John Z. Ayanian & Joel S. Weissman, Teaching Hospitals and Quality of Care: 
A Review of the Literature, 80 MILBANK Q. 569, 569‒70 (2002). 
 237. See Chemerinsky, supra note 114, at 16 (noting that at most law schools “clinical faculty 
are essentially second-class citizens—or worse” and are non-tenure-track faculty). 
 238. See id. at 18 n.16, 19. 
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service underlie teaching and give it an authority that teachers who 
merely pass on received understanding or transmit skills cannot 
match.239 
—Professor Michael A. Olivas 
 
One of the most potent criticisms of legal education today is that law 
professors are preoccupied with their scholarship at the expense of teaching.240  
It has become fashionable for critics, particularly non-academics and those law 
professors who have not been successful scholars, to assert that “many law 
professors are so absorbed in their scholarly pursuits that they are largely 
unconcerned with students’ needs,” 241  and “that there is no significant 
correlation between professors’ records of publishing and their teaching 
effectiveness.”242  Implicit in such arguments is the notion that the legal scholar 
can separate his or her academic expertise from teaching and deliver legal 
education in instrumentalist, reductive ways.  Sure, legal scholars can put the 
intellectual side “under erasure,” as Derrida would say,243 but this does not mean 
that scholarly inquiry fails to inform what they do as teachers and practitioners. 
It is wrong to suggest that law professors are scholars above all else, with law 
schools “set up like research universities” where scholarship is “the coin of the 
realm.”244  Critics often complain that professors run law schools to promote 
their scholarship, but this is far less true for law schools than graduate schools, 
where virtually everything is geared toward promoting the professors’ 
research.245  To be sure, scholarship has grown in importance in determining a 
law professor’s salary and standing among his or her colleagues, but it is far 
                                                        
 239. Letter from Michael A. Olivas, Former President of Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., to Hulett H. 
Askew, Consultant on Legal Educ. Section of Legal Educ. of Admission to the Bar, Am. Bar Assoc. 
3 (March 28, 2011), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20110409195546/http://www.aals. 
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 240. Newton, supra note 18, at 132. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 107‒08. 
 243. Spivak, supra note 22, at xiv. 
 244. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 43, 45. 
 245. See, e.g., Graduate Assitantships, WORCESTER ST. UNIV., http://www.worcester.edu/Gra 
duate-Assistantships (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).  For example, graduate school admissions 
decisions are driven by whether applicants can assist professors with their research; many 
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eme; see, e.g., Graduate Assistantship Responsibilities, WORCESTER ST. UNIV., http://www.worces 
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from being the only determinative factor. 246   Other currency, such as elite 
credentials or holding professional leadership positions, still carries considerable 
cachet.247  For example, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, prior to being 
appointed a justice, was a law professor at the University of Chicago and then 
Harvard Law School, where she later served as dean.  Yet, in Justice Kagan’s 
approximately fifteen-year long academic career, she published just six articles 
and one book chapter, 248  a publication record likely not even warranting 
tenureand certainly not the rank of full professorin most other colleges at 
those very same universities.249  The fact that professors like Justice Kagan can 
achieve the pinnacle of success belies the notion that scholarship is the coin of 
the realm in the legal academy. 
A.  Engaged Scholars Are Better Teachers 
It is a red herring to argue that scholarship is unrelated to teaching.  To be 
maximally effective teachers, professors must also be engaged with their 
discipline as scholars.  Non-scholar professors may have a wonderful classroom 
presence, great rapport with their students, and employ very effective and even 
cutting-edge pedagogical techniques.250  But professors should question whether 
these effective pedagogical skills are wasted on teaching stale content that they 
themselves mastered only by reading the casebook and through their own 
usually limited, years-old practice experience. 
Grappling with the sorts of questions one encounters when undertaking 
scholarly work is the best way to stay current in a field, while continually 
engaging the mind in a much more active way than simply staying atop the cases 
and legal literature.  Non-scholar professors are unlikely to remain on the cutting 
                                                        
 246. Matthew T. Bodie, Funding Legal Scholarship, 4 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF 
LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 107, 108‒09 (2014).  See O’Connor, supra note 36, at 422‒23 (2010) (finding 
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 247. See Bruce D. Fisher & Paul Bowen, The Law School Compensation System at Three Top 
Quartile State Law Schools: Factors Correlating with Law Professors’ Salaries and Suggestions, 
19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 687‒90 (1999). 
 248. Thomas Goldstein, 9750 Words on Elena Kagan, SCOTUSBLOG (May 8, 2010, 1:00 
A.M.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/05/9750-words-on-elena-kagan/. 
 249. See Christi Parsons, U. of C. Law Faculty Didn’t Back Kagan, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 30, 
2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-05-30/news/ct-met-kagan-chicago-20100530_1_ha 
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materials that do not generate new knowledge, the defining characteristic of “scholarship.” 
 250. See O’Connor, supra note 36, at 422‒23 (surveying the empirical literature on the 
relationship between scholarship and teaching effectiveness).  The few studies of the relationship 
between professors’ scholarly productivity and teaching effectiveness have been conflicting or 
inconclusive, measuring teaching effectiveness through student course evaluations, which tend to 
focus on instructional style rather than content and rigor.  Id. 
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edge of the current scholarship in their field, and will likely teach current modal 
practices but not necessarily the best practices.  Practitioners, serving as adjunct 
or part-time professors, usually have neither the time nor the inclination to track 
and contribute to legal scholarship and innovation.251  As a consequence, they 
are poorly positioned to mentor students in cutting-edge developments and in 
thinking about legal problems in new and innovative ways.  By contrast, an 
engaged scholar keeps abreast of cutting-edge thought in her specialty and 
contributes innovative perspectives and solutions through her scholarship.  
When surveyed, law students say that the most effective teachers are those who 
are the acknowledged scholarly experts in their field. 252   Indeed, the elite 
universities are thought to provide a superior education largely because the top 
scholars in their fields serve on their faculties. 
The quintessential expert is one who drives her field by creating new 
knowledge, not one who merely acquires expertise secondhand—by reading 
casebooks and treatises.  We should want those teaching our students to possess 
the highest level of expertise possible.  The ability to develop innovative ideas 
(“inventing”) requires a higher order of insight about one’s field than does 
understanding and applying pre-existing knowledge (“practicing”).253  The ABA 
accreditation standards, recognizing the correlation between scholarship and 
best-practices instruction, require that law school faculties engage in 
scholarship. 254   But Professor Tamanaha proposes the elimination of that 
standard, 255  while Professor Newton asserts that because law schools are 
professional schools, “[l]aw review articles published by law professors amount 
to an improper cross-subsidy from students to professors.”256  To be sure, law 
schools are professional schools training students for practice.  But they are also 
academic institutions, and if law professors do not generate legal scholarship, 
who will? 
                                                        
 251. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the teaching quality of adjunct professors is 
generally inferior to that of full-time faculty because they are less experienced teachers and have 
less time to prepare for class.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, You Get What You Pay For in Legal 
Education, NAT’L. L.J. (July 23, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202564055135?sl 
return=20150210223643.  ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 29 (suggesting that the ABA 
consider permitting a greater percentage of courses to be taught by adjunct and part-time faculty). 
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2015] The Legal Academy Under Erasure 403 
B.  Legal Scholarship Contributes to the Public Good 
As Judge Posner observed, “[t]he academy does not generate the knowledge 
that judges, lawyers, and legislators need in order to operate a modern legal 
system, yet there is no other institution capable of generating it.”257  The mission 
of universities is, and has been, the advancement of knowledge. 258  
Unfortunately, in recent years universities have begun to shift from a public good 
regime, valuing knowledge production for its own sake, to a capitalist regime, 
valuing knowledge production only if economically useful to the university or 
its graduates in the marketplace.259  But, law schools, allied with the academic 
mission of their universities, “must at times give society, not what society wants, 
but what it needs.”260  This Article proposes that legal education return to the 
public good model, a regime that implicitly considers law schools’ clients to 
include society and the legal profession, to which law professors can uniquely 
contribute through legal scholarship.  While teaching “spreads existing 
knowledge [to] thirty or so students at a time,” 261  scholarship creates new 
knowledge available to many, with the added benefit of potential lasting 
systemic impact. 
Yet, marketplace reformists, warped by consumerism, propose an academic 
model aimed at reducing the cost of tuition that guts legal scholarship and 
increases faculty teaching loads.  The marketplace regime’s proposed 
curriculum for legal education represents what economists call the “tragedy of 
the commons,” which is when a service or commodity important to society, such 
as basic scientific research, is not financially supported by the private market.262  
Legal scholarship may foster legal innovation and make important contributions 
to our understanding of the legal system, yet no one in the marketplace—neither 
                                                        
 257. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 468‒69 (1990). 
 258. See generally JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY, 12‒13 (I.T. Ker ed., 
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law students, law firms, nor clients—are individually willing to pay for this 
larger societal benefit.  The 2013 ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal 
Education noted the “constant, never fully resolvable tension” between the view 
of the law school as a private good designed to serve the needs of consumers in 
the legal marketplace and train lawyers for practice versus the broader view of 
the law school as a public good with the mission to serve society263 by producing 
scholarship and by training students, through a liberal arts education in the law, 
to be “broad-based problem solvers and societal leaders.”264  But as discussed 
below, these public goods will serve the private interest as well.  As the ABA 
Task Force noted, “[t]he traditional emphasis on legal education as a public good 
has led to a focus on quality of legal education as an overriding goal by law 
schools.”265 
The case for decentering professors from scholarship stands as foreground 
against the longstanding debate concerning the value of legal scholarship and 
the appropriate role for law schools as either academic or vocational schools.  In 
1936, Professor Fred Rodell complained that legal scholarship was irrelevant to 
law practice and public policy.266  The complaint that law professors write on 
esoteric topics for themselves and each other267 is an old criticism268 that has 
                                                        
 263. ABA TASK FORCE RPT., supra note 13, at 4‒5. 
 264. Id. at 12. 
 265. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
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gained renewed potency among judges, 269  the bar, 270  and even some law 
professors,271 just as it did during the 1990s when people were complaining that 
professors were out of touch and did not teach students real-world skills.  Legal 
scholarship today is heavy on theory and interdisciplinarity (“law and . . .”), and 
critics note that most law review articles are never cited or used by 
practitioners.272  Yet, the same is true in most fields, where practitioners273 as 
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AM. L. 33, 33 (2008) (stating that legal scholarship is increasingly irrelevant to the legal system 
and that “law review articles have left terra firma to soar into outer space”); Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 
(1992) (observing that most legal scholarship is useless from his view on the bench of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 320 (1989) (a New York Court of Appeals judge expressed her 
“disappoint[ment] not to find more in the law reviews that is of value and pertinence to our cases . 
. . .  The concern that academics are writing for each other is indeed well founded”); Alex Kozinski, 
Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 297, 318 (2000) (Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals judge’s criticism of law review articles as irrelevant to lawyers and judges); see 
also Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews that Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-reviews.html (quoting Chief 
Justice John Roberts at a recent judicial conference, “[p]ick up a copy of any law review . . . [and 
it] isn’t of much help to the bar”); Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding 
Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
03/19/us/19bar.html?_r=0 (providing the opinion of several judges). 
 270. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 172, at 5 (positing that “[p]ractitioners tend to view 
much academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day concerns”); Newton, 
supra note 18, at 105, 114 (asserting that “law reviews publish approximately 150,000 to 190,000 
pages per year.  Yet the majority of those pages . . . provide little if any social utility (other than to 
their authors) and represent a colossal amount of wasted resources and opportunity costs”). 
 271. See, e.g., David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like 
This One: Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 
38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 761, 768 (2005) (stating that “[t]oo much of legal scholarship is becoming 
‘law professor scholarship,’ a discourse among theorists with little practical application”). 
 272. See Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of Two Decades of Contract Law Scholarship on 
Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 57 SMU L. REV. 105, 117 (2004) (reporting results of 
empirical study finding that “judicial citation of contract law scholarship is apparently rather 
infrequent, with almost 70% of the predominately top-tier subset of contract law articles here 
considered never having been cited by a single court,” and that “the average article considered in 
this study was cited approximately 50 times more frequently by other scholars in law review articles 
than it was in judicial opinions”); Michael McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by 
Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 660 (1998) (finding that state and federal 
appeals court citations to the top law reviews have dropped significantly in the last few decades); 
Newton, supra note 267, at 416 (finding that the Supreme Court cites law review articles far less 
frequently than in the past, with many of the articles cited not written by full-time law professors); 
Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of 
Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051, 1051‒53 (1991) (finding a low 
percentage of law review citations); Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
309, 335 Fig.12, 336 (2007) (finding that forty-three percent of law review articles are never citied). 
 273. See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1331‒32 (2002) 
(discussing the rate of citations in the humanities and social sciences); Newton, supra note 18, 119‒
406 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:359 
well as policymakers274 ignore most of the scholarship.  As Deborah L. Rhode 
explained, however, “there is no system that can produce only good scholarship.  
An academic culture that eliminates the bad scholarship will not provide a seed-
bed for the good.”275 
Two recent empirical studies examining citations to legal scholarship by the 
U.S. Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals, the most comprehensive and 
methodologically sound studies to date, refute the notion that courts ignore legal 
scholarship.276  Analyzing all Supreme Court decisions between 1949 to 2009, 
Professors Lee Petherbridge and David L. Schwartz found: (a) the Court cited 
legal scholarship in approximately one-third of its decisions; (b) the citation rate 
had increased significantly over the years; and (c) citations to legal scholarship 
often seemed to influence the Court’s decision or reasoning, with the Court most 
often citing scholarship in difficult or important cases. 277   Professors 
Petherbridge and Schwartz concluded: “we think the evidence reasonably leads 
to an interpretation of the Court’s use of scholarship that is strongly contrary to 
the claim that courts and practitioners have little use for it.”278  A similar study 
of citations by the federal courts of appeals, analyzing 296,098 reported 
decisions between 1950 and 2008, found that while only thirty-seven percent of 
the opinions between 1950 and 1979 cited legal scholarship, sixty-three percent 
of the opinions between 1980 and 2008 did so, a two-fold increase.279  Likewise, 
a study of 200 business law opinions issued by the Delaware courts between 
1997 and 2007 found no decline in their citation to law review articles.280  
Although the Delaware courts usually did not rest their holding on the scholarly 
commentary, they did cite it more often in cases presenting novel or difficult 
issues.281 
                                                        
22 (complaining that legal scholarship is too theoretical or interdisciplinary and citing many others 
with the same complaint). 
 274. See, e.g., Beth McMurtie, Social Scientists Seek New Ways to Influence Public Policy, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 2013, at A20‒21 (discussing the longstanding problem that 
research by academic social scientists has often failed to impact policymaking). 
 275. Rhode, supra note 273, at 1331‒32. 
 276. See Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme 
Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1005 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee 
Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1359 (2011). 
 277. Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 276, at 1005‒08, 1012‒16. 
 278. Id. at 1016. 
 279. Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 276, at 1359‒61. 
 280. Michelle M. Harner & Jason A. Cantone, Is Legal Scholarship Out of Touch? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Use of Scholarship in Business Cases, 19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2011). 
 281. Id. at 25, 30, 48‒49 (finding, however, that the courts more frequently cited articles by 
practitioners than articles by professors). 
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Indeed, there are many instances where legal scholarship has significantly 
altered the course of legal precedent or public policy; for example, Professor 
Charles Reich’s scholarship that changed due process law through the Goldberg 
v. Kelly282 decision;283 Professor Guido Calabresi’s impactful work on product 
safety liability; 284  Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s scholarship helping to 
establish sexual harassment law;285 the “Chicago School’s” capturing of the 
Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence;286  Professor Paul Bator’s work on 
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence;287 and the influential work of Professor 
Franklin E. Zimring and colleagues on the counterproductive effects of “get-
tough” juvenile justice policies.288   More recently, Professor (now Senator) 
Elizabeth Warren’s scholarship and associated advocacy on consumer financial 
protection289 was chiefly responsible for the creation of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.290 
When courts fail to cite relevant scholarship, it may be because scholarly 
commentary tends to articulate the ideal legal structure or doctrine, whereas 
judges are constrained by precedent.  Nevertheless, an ideal often informs the 
possible, influencing jurists’ background perspectives and conceptual 
frameworks for understanding legal problems.291  The thinking and practices of 
lawyers, judges, and law clerks is influenced by what their professors (whose 
thinking was molded by scholarship in their field) taught them in law school.  
They also are influenced when they consult professors about cases and when 
they hear professors talk at legal forums and continuing legal education 
                                                        
 282. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 283. See Ronald A. Cass & Jack M. Beermann, Throwing Stones at the Mudbank: The Impact 
of Scholarship on Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 9‒11 (1993). 
 284. See generally Guido Calabresi, “THE COST OF ACCIDENTS”: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 1‒16 (1970) (discussing five proposed reforms to product safety liability and providing 
a thorough examination of the issues posed by the proposed reforms). 
 285. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). 
 286. See William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the 
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1415‒17 (1990) (describing 
the impact of the Chicago school’s view of antitrust on Supreme Court decisions). 
 287. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Foreword: Academic Influence on the Court, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1189, 1193 n.20 (2012) (citing the influence of Professor Bator’s work on the law of habeas corpus). 
 288. Franklin E. Zimring & Stephen Rushin, Did Changes in Juvenile Sanctions Reduce 
Juvenile Crime Rates? A Natural Experiment, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 58‒59 (2013) 
(summarizing their empirical findings). 
 289. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe At Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY J. 8, 16‒18 (Summer 2007), 
available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf. 
 290. Jackie Calmes & Sewell Chan, Obama Chooses Warren to set up Consumer Bureau, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2010, at B5. 
 291. Katyal, supra note 287, at 1190‒94 (describing the influence of scholarship on the 
Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act decision). 
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workshops.292  A jurist’s perspective on constitutional law may be influenced by 
critical theory learned in law school courses, a transactional attorney’s approach 
to contract negotiation may be altered by exposure to the economic principles of 
contract law, and a lawyer’s approach to counseling clients may be influenced 
by learning about therapeutic jurisprudence or by reading The Trial293 or Bleak 
House294 in a law and literature course.  A lawyer’s thinking may even be shaped 
by something quite esoteric, such as Professor David S. Caudill’s Lacanian 
psychoanalysis of law, which changed my perspective on the legal system.295 
Moreover, scholarship may have a greater impact on the development of 
legislation and administrative regulations than it does on judicial decision-
making.  To be sure, while legislators and other policymakers virtually never 
consult law review articles when drafting legislation,296 their staffs, legislative 
task forces, and the law professors and other experts they consult may rely on 
scholarship and scholarly opinion in various ways.  For example, I served on a 
Virginia task force appointed by the state legislature to study whether the 
Commonwealth should adopt competency to stand trial standards or permit the 
insanity defense in the juvenile court.  At the outset, the task force consulted the 
relevant legal and mental health scholarship on these issues, which substantially 
influenced the task force’s recommendations. 
Professors Hricik & Salzmann observe that in law practice they often faced 
complex problems that could have benefited from scholarly, particularly 
interdisciplinary, analysis of the kind that practitioners and judges have neither 
the time nor expertise to conduct.297  When practitioners view legal scholarship 
as irrelevant, as admittedly it often appears to be, perhaps it is not because their 
legal education was too academic or that legal scholarship is, in fact, 
irrelevant.  Instead, the problem may be that law schools fail to educate students 
on the ways in which scholarship can inform law practice.298  This leaves many 
                                                        
 292. See Gary A. Munneke, Managing A Law Practice: What You Need to Learn in Law 
School, 30 PACE L. REV. 1207, 1220 (2010). 
 293. KAFKA, supra note 151. 
 294. DICKENS, supra note 148. 
 295. See DAVID S. CAUDILL, LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAW: TOWARD A 
PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY at xi‒xv (1997). 
 296. See Cass & Beerman, supra note 283, at 4‒7 (noting some scholarly influence on 
legislative decisions, but that such influence often occurs in relation to “broader issues that ha[ve] 
permeated the popular realm . . . as to influence voting or at least the votes of active interest 
groups”). 
 297. See Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 271, at 781. 
 298. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 770‒71.  Sternlight stated: 
Academics . . . should cease making comments that lead students to see theory and 
practice as conflicting with one another.  Instead, academics should attempt to help 
students see those disciplines as symbiotically supportive. . . . Too many academics, 
consciously or not, encourage students to see legal practice . . . as an intellectual 
wasteland. . . . [A]cademics also do a disservice to their theoretical scholarship when 
2015] The Legal Academy Under Erasure 409 
lawyers “not knowing what they don’t know”299 concerning the actual value of 
legal theory as well as the social sciences, business sciences, and humanities to 
what they do in practice.300  This implies that their legal education was not 
academic enough.  The problem is compounded by the fact that law professors 
often do not produce scholarship of the same quality as academics in other fields, 
because law professors are the products of the same legal education as 
practitioners, not having had the benefit of the scholarly training provided in 
research-oriented graduate degree programs.301  Current reform proposals would 
erode the rather modest extent to which law schools do provide scholarly 
training, moving legal education back to a time when law school was trade 
school and law professors were practitioners, who just taught what they knew 
from their own limited practice experience and the casebooks they read.302 
To be sure, however, much could be done to improve the quality and relevance 
of legal  scholarship.  It suffers considerably because virtually everything written 
is published somewhere sans the quality control found in the peer-reviewed 
journals of other disciplines because would-be law professors receive little or no 
scholarly training or preparation, and because most law schools have scholarship 
standards for tenure (typically only three or four publications in non-peer 
reviewed journals) below the quality and quantity standards of most other 
academic disciplines.303 
                                                        
they fail to show students the relevance, and thus power, of their theories.  Instead, too 
often students accept the professors’ point that the worlds of practice and theory have 
little in common and then go on to embrace the world of practice and reject the world of 
theory. 
Id. 
 299. Wendy L. Werner, DIY Professional Development, LAW PRACTICE MAGAZINE, 
May/June 2013, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/20 
13/may-june/career-steps.html. 
 300. See Edwards, supra note 118, at 2‒3. 
 301. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1321‒23 
(2002). 
 302. See Bruce A. Kimball, The Principle, Politics, and Finances of Introducing Academic 
Merit as the Standard for Hiring for “the Teaching of Law as a Career,” 1870‒1900, 31 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 617, 618 (2006) (contrasting the “traditional hiring standard of professional 
experience and reputation” with the new “hiring standard of academic merit” emerging during the 
end of the nineteenth century). 
 303. Professor Larry Rosenthal provides a touchstone example of the hazards of non-peer-
reviewed legal scholarship: 
William Stuntz was one of the most prolific and cited criminal procedure scholars in 
recent decades, but his work often contained broad empirical generalizations with 
questionable empirical support—the kind of work that might be questioned by the editors 
of a peer-reviewed criminology journal, but which law review editors were evidently 
eager to publish, and legal scholars were subsebsequently [sic] eager to cite.  For years 
(really decades), the process of post-publication peer review described in this post 
seemed to smile on Professor Stuntz’s claims—not because anyone systematically 
examined the evidence supporting these claims, but because they offered support for 
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Moreover, law professors often fail to fully consider the feasibility and 
practical application of their theories in the real world.  For example, when the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Professor Lani Guinier’s controversial 
writings on voting rights were publically aired, President Clinton withdrew his 
nomination of her to the post of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.304  
Professors Guinier’s fate, postulates Mary Ann Glendon, may have been the 
result, inter alia, of her fellow academic’s failure to scrutinize the real-world 
implications of Guinier’s work.  Consider also Berkeley Law School Professor 
John Yoo’s “Torture Memo,” later widely criticized for providing misguided 
legal advice, which provided the legal predicate for the enhanced interrogation 
techniques of terrorist suspects utilized by the Bush Administration.305  Though 
Professor Yoo was widely considered to be a “superstar” scholar,306 his lack of 
practice experience may have left him ill-equipped to recognize the limits of his 
innovative theories of executive power when applied in the real world.307 
Legal scholarship must be of much higher quality and relevance.  It must 
explicate, rather than obscure, its practical relevance to law students, practicing 
attorneys, and judges.  Scholars should derive their theories from real-world 
data, explain the links between theory and application, promulgate solutions 
                                                        
others who wished to make arguments that were supported by these same claims.  In 
other disciplines, however, empirical claims are not accepted merely because someone 
has already made them—they require persuasive supporting evidence.  In their recent 
reviews of Professor Stuntz’s final book largely recapitulating Stuntz’s law review 
articles, Stephen Schulhofer and Donald Dripps have dismantled a great many of Stuntz’s 
central empirical claims.  This is the kind of thing that rigorous peer review would be 
more likely to catch. 
Larry Rosenthal, Comments to Et Tu, Adam? The Lazy Critiques of Law Reviews Continue, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 21, 2013 9:42 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/10/et-
tu-adam-the-lazy-critiques-of-law-reviews-continues.html.  Although introducing some form of 
peer review into law reviews would likely improve overall quality, one should not be overly 
sanguine about its benefits.  Studies have documented bias in peer recommendations that often 
reflects the reviewers’ theoretical and ideological bents, the unreliability of peer review, and the 
lack of thoroughness in peer review.  In addition, the peer-review process can produce long delays 
between paper submission and publication, which is especially problematic for time-sensitive 
topics.  Finally, journal reviewers and editors sometimes reject papers they find too contrary to their 
own views.  See generally Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Secretive and Subjective, Peer Review Proves 
Resistant to Study, 341 SCIENCE 1331 (2013) (discussing poor peer-reviews); Carole J. Lee et al., 
Advances in Information Sciences: Bias in Peer Review, 64 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 
2 (2013) (describing the different biases that exist in peer review); Richard Smith, Peer Review: A 
Flawed Process at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 178 (2006) 
(describing the inefficiency, inconsistency, and bias of peer review). 
 304. Mary Ann Glendon, What’s Wrong with the Elite Law Schools, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1993, 
at A16. 
 305. Lawrence Rosenthal, Those Who Can’t, Teach: What the Legal Career of John Yoo Tells 
Us About Who Should Be Teaching Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 1563, 1563, 1566‒67 (2011). 
 306. Id. at 1564. 
 307. Id. at 1619‒25. 
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having a realistic chance of real-world application, and write in a manner 
accessible to non-academics.308 
VI.  TOO MANY LAW SCHOOLS, TOO MANY LAWYERS 
Finally, an important step in improving students’ employment prospects, 
while preserving the legal academy, is to reduce the over-supply of law schools.  
The current glut of lawyers is the result of the late twentieth century boom in 
law schools (we now have 204 ABA-accredited schools producing 44,000 
graduates every year)309 combined with the contraction in the legal services 
market. 310   The profit motive has captured today’s universities, 311  which is 
partly why we have an overabundance of law schools and law graduates unable 
to secure employment.312  Many law schools were established to brand their 
universities as comprehensive institutions and to act as “cash cows,” because 
law schools charge high tuition but have lower costs than most other professional 
schools.313 
I agree with critics that we need fewer law schools and smaller entering class 
sizes.314  The alarming levels of student indebtedness, coupled with the inability 
of recent graduates to find decent jobs or even a job utilizing their law degree, 
                                                        
 308. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 768‒77. 
 309. ABA-Approved Law Schools, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/leg 
al_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); ABA-
Approved Law Schools by Year, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_educ 
ation/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/by_year_approved.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
Twenty-four new law schools have received ABA accreditation just since 1990.  See also Jerome 
M. Organ, Legal Education and the Legal Profession: Convergence or Divergence?, 38 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 885, 900 n. 75 (2012). 
 310. Campos, supra note 1, at 212 (stating that “[a]s a percentage of gross domestic product, 
the legal services sector in America has contracted by nearly one-third since the late 1970s”).  In 
addition to the pressures on law firms during the economic downturn, there has been a restructuring 
of the legal services market.  Online self-service vendors like Legal-Zoom allow customers to draft 
their own simple legal documents without the services of an attorney, and major law firms are 
increasingly utilizing non-lawyer services to perform paralegal-type functions.  See RICHARD 
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 33‒39 (2008) 
(arguing that legal services are evolving toward being standardized and prepackaged, thus requiring 
far fewer lawyers). 
 311. See SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 73, at 17‒21, 25‒27 (describing the influence 
of the corporate model on higher education). 
 312. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 145‒54 (describing unemployment statistics and how 
they underestimate the number of unemployed law school graduates). 
 313. Howard B. Eisenberg, Mission, Marketing, and Academic Freedom in Today’s 
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: An Essay, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 7‒8 (1999). 
 314. See Campos, supra note 1, at 222 (stating that “law schools must become much less 
expensive and produce far fewer graduates than they do now”). 
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place enormous stress on students.315  While the indebtedness problem is to 
some extent overestimated,316 the lack of employment opportunities is not.317  
For 2013 law school graduates, the ABA reports that only fifty-seven percent 
secured employment that requires admission to the bar,318 and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics “projects that [only] 47.6 percent of graduates of ABA-
accredited law schools over the course of this decade will get legal jobs.”319 
Not only are law schools producing too many lawyers, but they also are 
producing too many bad ones, something we surely need not do given the glut 
of attorneys.  Yet, the admissions offices at many schools increasingly serve 
more of a marketing than a selection function in this buyer’s market.  Schools 
must compete for students who are savvy consumers sensitive to comparative 
tuition costs, scholarship availability, degree requirements, and schools’ job 
placement success.320  To maintain the privileges of the privileged class, lower-
ranked schools in particular will matriculate students who lack the ability to 
succeed in law school, pass the bar, land a decent job, or be effective lawyers.321  
                                                        
 315. Inceptia Survey Reveals Financial Stress Taking Toll on College Students, INCEPTIA (July 
26, 2012), http://www.inceptia.org/about/news/jul-26-2012.  A recent national survey found that 
loan indebtedness was the number one stress or for a large percentage of students, even more than 
academics.  Id. 
 316. See Campos, supra note 1, at 178, 204 (reasoning that the rising cost of legal education is 
“not sustainable,” with students incurring “[d]ebts that [n]o [h]onest [m]an [c]an [p]ay”).  
Assuming that the average combined undergraduate and law school debt of graduates is $130,000, 
if students were to opt to repay their loans over a twenty-five-year periodm that amounts to monthly 
payments of about $600, not much more than payments on a car loan.  Though this imposes a 
substantial burden on graduates whose average starting salary is only $60,000‒$70,000, their 
salaries will increase substantially over the course of their careers and likely will not be the sole 
source of family income.  But see id. at 206 (estimating that the average debt of a 2016 law school 
graduate will be $165,000, which amounts to a monthly payment of approximately $1,100). 
 317. See id. at 202 n.99, 210‒11 (reviewing employment data showing that in 2011‒12, only 
fifty-eight percent of law graduates obtained jobs requiring a law degree and that many graduates 
of elite schools did not secure desirable jobs).  As one discouraged graduate put it: 
I’m humiliated and demoralized. . . . I’ve resigned myself to the fact that I will never 
have a career.  I won’t have retirement savings. . . . I will continue to be immune to the 
rejection letters I receive in response to the litany of resumes and cover letters I send out 
daily. . . .  I will be just another number in this generation of lawyers who will fall by the 
wayside. 
Id. at 178. 
 318. Paul Caron, ABA Releases “Bleak” Jobs Data for 2013 Law School Grads, TAX PROF 
BLOG, (Apr. 10, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/04/aba-releases-.html. 
 319. Campos, supra note 1, at 213‒14 (citing data from the United States Department of 
Labor). 
 320. See generally Jeffrey Selingo, Colleges Must Prepare for a Buyer’s Market, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://search.proquest.com/columbo.law.cua.edu/docview/1325038 
908/fulltext/FE7C8DEC4A014119PQ/12?accountid=147762 (discussing college students being 
more conscious about these factors). 
 321. The median LSAT score of incoming students is lower than it was several years ago at 
half the law schools in the country.  Sloan, supra note 2.  Some argue that the lowest-ranked schools 
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As Professor Daniel D. Barnhizer observed, “because we have admitted the 
otherwise inadmissible, and because law school finances are dependent on 
student tuition payments, we incur a high cost to ‘nurture’ those who are neither 
particularly good students nor likely to become good lawyers no matter how 
many skills courses through which we put them.”322 
Additionally, we must confront the societal cost of producing so many 
attorneys in terms of the unnecessary litigation and other kinds of “over-
lawyering” they must generate to keep themselves employed.  We now have 
over one million licensed attorneys in the United States, more than one for every 
300 people (open the phone book and see the reams of pages devoted to lawyers, 
more than any other service or profession).  What our society needs, instead, is 
more nurses, doctors, engineers, scientists, computer specialists, teachers, social 
workers, and the like, yet schools are producing 44,000 law school graduates 
every year (as compared to only 9,000 doctorates in the physical sciences, 8,000 
in engineering, and 8,000 in the social sciences).  We are falling behind other 
nations in math and science, not in legal services, though we do not have enough 
attorneys for underserved populations.   
To address the systemic problem of too many schools producing too many 
lawyers, reformers propose limiting the amount of federal student loan money 
available to law schools (which currently receive over one billion dollars a 
year)323 and tying loan money to performance measures such as affordability and 
learning outcomes—with an emphasis on practical skills, bar passage rates, and 
job placement.324  These measures would cause some law schools to close and 
lead to smaller entering class sizes in others.  Reducing federal aid money and 
tying it to educational performance is a good way to reduce the glut of lawyers 
and ensure educational quality.325  Indeed, unlike the ABA, the AAMC has 
effectively ensured that there is not a substantial over-supply of physicians by 
keeping the number of medical schools to only 141326 and by requiring very high 
standards for admission—higher than the standards of all but the most elite law 
schools.327 
                                                        
serve the societal need of producing graduates who may be more likely to serve underserved 
populations, yet clients are benefitted little if served by an incompetent or marginally-competent 
attorney.   
 322. See Barnhizer, supra note 7, at 670. 
 323. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 179‒80; see also Newton, supra note 27, at 67‒68 
(opining that the federal loan structure should be altered to provide law schools with a financial 
incentive to admit a more reasonable number of students). 
 324. See Newton, supra note 27, at 67‒71. 
 325. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 180; Henderson, supra note 1, at 469‒70. 
 326. See Medical Schools, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS.,  https://www.aamc.org/about/medical 
schools/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
 327. See, e.g., MSAR: Getting Started, Medical School Admissions Requirements, ASS’N AM. 
MED. CS. 7, 59 (2012); School of Medicine M.D. Admissions, Prerequisites and Requirements, 
JOHN HOPKINS MED., http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/som/admissions/md/application_process/ 
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Furthermore, the quality of legal education would be improved if the U.S. 
News rankings better reflected educational quality.  Rankings are valuable in 
holding schools accountable, providing information to consumers, and acting as 
a sorting and signaling function for students and employers alike. 328   Law 
schools’ obsession with their ranking drives certain priorities that trump more 
appropriate academic considerations. 329   These rankings place too much 
emphasis on factors that do not necessarily correlate with the quality, rigor, or 
innovativeness of instruction, such as institutional wealth, peer reputation 
(which is a self-fulfilling cycle; schools are rated highly by peers because of 
their name recognition and because they are already highly ranked), and job 
placement success.330 
Not only has the profit motive captured universities and law schools, but law 
professors as well.331  As Professor Tamanaha observes: 
Our pay is far better than that of other professors in the university, and 
we teach less than most professors.  (And unlike professors generally, 
who undergo a rigorous tenure process, tenure for law professors—
lifetime job security—is achieved with a relatively low quantity of 
scholarly production and in practice is seldom denied.)  Our quality of 
life is far better than that of lawyers, and we make more money than 
most lawyers.332 
The average salary for tenure-track law professors is approximately $142,000 
as compared to only $95,000 for professors in other disciplines. 333   “Star” 
professors and those at elite law schools make much more, usually between 
                                                        
prerequisites_requirements.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
 328. See Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the 
Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1515‒17 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL LEWIS, 
MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003)). 
 329. See Kenneth Lasson, Compelling Orthodoxy: Myth and Mystique in the Marketing of 
Legal Education, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 273, 275‒78 (2012) (pointing out the problems inherent in 
trying to increase a school’s ranking). 
 330. Not only do some schools manipulate their job placement statistics, but it is also difficult 
to equate placement statistics across schools that differ markedly in local economic conditions and 
the percentage of their students opting for various types of legal and non-legal jobs.  See Paul 
Campos, Served, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/87251/law-
school-employment-harvard-yale-georgetown. 
 331. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 77‒78. 
 332. Id. at 52‒53.  A colleague once remarked that law professors were the last of the 
aristocracy.  Hyperbole, but true when compared to professors elsewhere in the academy who are 
paid substantially less and who usually have fewer perks in the way of travel, research budgets, 
staff support and working environs and who are tenured at the associate rather than full professor 
rank, yet have doctoral degrees and far greater scholarly expectations placed on them for tenure 
and promotion. 
 333. Average Median Salaries of Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty Members at 4-Year 
Colleges, by Discipline and Rank, 2012‒13, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 23, 2013, at 7, available 
at http://chronicle.texterity.com/almanac/201314almanac?sub_id=q2mohohy0qkG#pg1. 
2015] The Legal Academy Under Erasure 415 
$200,000 and $350,000.334  Law professors rationalize their salaries based on 
what they could be making in practice, but as Professor Tamanaha suggests, 
many law professors would not necessarily have the kinds of practices, or 
success in practice, that would justify high salaries.335  In any case, the market 
does not drive high salaries to attract lawyers to the professoriate, as the over 
500 resumes submitted every year for the AALS faculty recruitment conference 
demonstrate.336 
Moreover, law professors’ salaries are difficult to justify when comparing 
their credentials and productivity with that of other professors.  Most academic 
positions require an impressive publication record in peer-reviewed journals 
before being hired on the tenure-track.  Further, with the median time to 
complete a Ph.D. program being almost eight years, doctoral degrees typically 
take much longer to earn than a law degree. 337   This contrasts with the 
requirements for being a law professor, which typically include only a three-
year, non-research degree338 and little scholarship before being hired—typically 
only one or two publications in non-peer-reviewed law reviews.339  This does 
not mean that law professors should be paid less, however, but only that 
professors in other disciplines deserve to be paid more.  In any event, the median 
                                                        
 334. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 48‒49; Universities With Highest Average Pay for Full 
Professors, 2012‒2013, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 23, 2013, at 7, available at 
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 335. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 47. 
 336. See, e.g., Memorandum from Judith Areen, Exec. Dir. Ass’n Am. Law Schools, & Regina 
Burch, Assoc. Dir. Ass’n Am. Law Schools, to the Council of the ABA Section on Legal Education 
and Admission to the Bar (May 28, 2014). 
 337. Characteristics of Recipients of Research Doctorates, 2012, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
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is Designed to Give Lawyers Another Chance.  Revisiting Penological Theory, 32 S.U. L. REV. 1, 
4 n.8 (2004). 
 338. Although it usually is less demanding to earn a J.D. degree than it is to earn an M.D. or 
Ph.D., those hired as tenure-track law professors typically were top-performing students from top 
law schools.  See Richard E. Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the 
Professoriate and Its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 599 (2003) 
(reporting results of empirical study finding that eighty-six percent of all newly-hired law 
professors graduated from a top-25 law school, one-third graduated from either Harvard or Yale, 
and almost one-half served on the law review while in law school).  Law professors have sterling 
credentials, which is not a de facto requirement for other academics, where hiring decisions are 
based primarily on the candidate’s scholarship and letters of recommendation. 
 339. See Brian Leiter, Why is it So Easy to Get Tenure in Law Schools?, LEITER REPORTS: A 
PHIL. BLOG (June 24, 2004, 11:53 AM) http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2004/06/why_is_it_ 
so_ea.html. 
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attorney salary of $114,300 340  is not, as Professor Tamanaha suggests, an 
appropriate benchmark for law professors’ salaries341 given their cream-of-the-
crop credentials.  Few lawyers have the academic preparation, scholarly 
creativity, or academic inclination to be a law professor.342   Furthermore, I 
would suggest that the teaching, scholarship, and pro bono professional service 
of professors is a greater service to society than the work of many highly-paid 
attorneys, who advance the parochial interests of individual clients that often are 
not coextensive with society’s best interest.343 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The real crisis in legal education is not high tuition, student debt, or the poor 
job market, all of which are very significant concerns.  The crux of the problem 
is law schools’ failure to prepare students for twenty-first century law practice, 
which is more complex and interdisciplinary than ever before—a failure that in 
turn leads to the under-employment of law school graduates.344  I agree with 
Professor William Henderson that “[t]o justify our current price tag, a law degree 
needs to be a transformative educational experience that confers personal and 
professional benefits to students and positive external benefits to society in the 
form of more capable leaders and problem solvers.”345  But current proposals to 
reform legal education will both harm the legal profession and law students.  A 
two-year law degree focusing on nuts-and-bolts practice skills, as many are now 
proposing, takes us back to a time in American legal education when law schools 
were little more than vocational schools. 
We must retain the three-year program of study but make it more robust: teach 
the core subjects and applications of other disciplines relevant to everyday law 
practice, expose students to a reasonable range of specialty areas, and integrate 
skills training throughout the curriculum.  To accomplish these goals, law 
schools should adapt the medical school model to legal education.  This would 
entail a curriculum that provides a comprehensive foundation in basic legal 
                                                        
 340. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2013, 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes231011.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
 341. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 47. 
 342. See Robin I. Mordfin, Students to Students: Teaching the Legal Academies Process, U. 
CHI. L. SCH. (2013) http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/spring13/studentstoscholars 
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 343. See e.g., Determining Whether Legal Advice to Violate the Law Is Ethical, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
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over 200 accredited law schools that frequently compete against one another to offer sizeable tuition 
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 344. Henderson, supra note 1, at 461-62. 
 345. Id. at 465. 
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subjects and legally relevant other disciplines, culminating in a series of clinical 
rotations where the basic doctrinal and interdisciplinary knowledge is applied in 
practice.  We also must not gut support for faculty scholarship in the hopes that 
doing so will cut costs and encourage professors to focus on teaching practical 
skills.  Contrary to popular claims, engaged scholars are better teachers, and 
legal scholarship contributes meaningfully and substantially to law practice and 
reform.  Finally, law schools must address the employment problem and 
improve educational quality by producing fewer attorneys.  We need fewer, but 
better, law schools. 
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